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POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE
REPUBLIC OF FRANCE: LESSONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES
T. Alexander Aleinikoff*

For three decades following the end of World War II, American
refugee ''policy'' was a collage of ad hoc programs responding to the
compelling needs of displaced, homeless, or politically oppressed
persons. 1 The Refugee Act of 19802 was enacted to create order out
of the legislative chaos. 3 The Act established a systematic procedure
for determining the number of refugees to be admitted each year, 4 and
brought United States law into conformity with the Geneva Convention 5
and Protocol 6 relating to the Status of Refugees. Drafted from the
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This study has benefited from the thoughtful comments of Scott Burke, Roger Conner, Catherine
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at the German Marshall Fund of the United States on November 10, 1983. Michael Bass, Anne
Gaughan, Karen Horn, Patricia Lazard, and Mathias Reimann provided invaluable research in,
and translation of, foreign materials. Robert Schiff and Carolyn Gans also provided careful
and important research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Frank Loy and Michael Teitelbaum
for conceiving of this study and encouraging me to undertake it.
The study was funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Additional support
was received from the University of Michigan Law School Cook Legal Research Fund.
I. The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (testimony of Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs);
see also Helton, Political Asylum Under the Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 243, 243-50 (1984); Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 3 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 91, 92-96 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Refugee Act].
3. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. I, 5, 6 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. I, 3 (1979).
4. Refugee Act, supra note 2, § 201(b), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 207, 8
u.s.c. § 1157 (1982).
5. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Refugee Act substantially adopts the Convention's definition of "refugee," compare INA§ 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1982)
with Convention, supra, art. l(A), but goes beyond the Convention by recognizing as a refugee
an alien fearing persecution in the country in which she resides.
6. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened/or signature Jan. 31, 1967,.19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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perspective of the United States as a country of "second asylum," the
Act contemplated the orderly selection of persons overseas. 7
Almost as an afterthought, the legislators added a section to the Act
that, for the first time, established a statutory basis for the granting
of asylum to aliens in the United States. 8 Under the new provision,
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney
General may grant asylum to an alien "physically present in the United
States or at a land border or port of entry" if the Attorney General
determines that the alien meets the statute's definition of "refugee" 9
- that is, a person who has a well-founded fear that, if returned home,
he or she will be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a social group, or political opinion. 10
It was not anticipated that a great number of aliens would apply
for asylum under the new section. Only ~ few thousand aliens a year
had sought asylum in previous years under procedures established by
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations. 11 In the few
years since passage of the Refugee Act, however, more than 120,000
asylum applications have been filed; and the vast majority are still
pending before administrative authorities. 12 Asylum has thus ap-

7. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6 (1979).
8. Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act, asylum was governed by regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Attorney General's authority under INA§ 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982), to administer laws relating to immigration. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979); see
8 C.F.R. §§ 108, 236.3 (1980). The creation of a statutory asylum process received scant attention during consideration of the Refugee Act. The primary focus of both the House and Senate
reports on the Act was provisions of the bill dealing with refugee admissions, resettlement, and
assistance. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979); see also IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AsYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND REsPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 6 (June 1982) [hereinafter cited as INS ADJUDICATIONS).
9. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
10. INA § 10l(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(42) (1982).
The Act also amended INA § 243(h) to make mandatory the withholding of deportation or
exclusion of an alien likely to be persecuted if returned home. The eligibility standard for relief
under § 243(h) and § 208 are the same, both deriving from the Geneva Convention's guarantee
of non-refoulement (non-return) for refugees. Convention, supra note 5, art. 33, § 1. By regulation, asylum requests made to an immigration judge are considered as requests for § 243(h)
relief. 8 C.F.R. § 2083(b) (1983).
11. In 1978, 3,702 aliens filed asylum applications with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). In 1979, 5,801 applications were filed. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
The Refugee Act itself evidences that Congress did not expect a great number of asylees each
year; it provides that no more than 5,000 aliens granted asylum may be granted permanent resident status each year. INA§ 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 159(b) (1982). See Scanlon, Regulating Refugee
Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
618, 627 (1981).
12. Unfortunately, there are no reliable data regarding the precise numbe{ of claims filed,
adjudicated and pending. The numbers cited in this Article are based on reports from the INS
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), but even these sources concede the
softness and incompleteness of their data. See infra notes 16 & 28.
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propriately been described as the "wild card in the immigration deck." 13
This extraordinary increase in the number of pending asylum claims
is cause for concern. First, such an increase may seriously tax procedures established for a far smaller flow. The overburdening of the
process may result in substantial delays and proceedings that threaten
the accuracy of the determinations. ·
Second, the dramatic increase may indicate that the process is being
used (or abused) by aliens who file frivolous claims to forestall return
to their home countries. The high rate of denials, asserts the government, substantiates the view that many applicants are "economic
migrants," not refugees. 14 Adjudicating frivolous claims takes time and
money and causes delays which actually may spark the filing of additional claims.
Advocates of asylum applicants contest the government's view. Their
criticisms represent a third concern about the present system: the
accuracy and fairness of the decision-making process. The critics maintain that the government, by labeling certain classes of aliens "economic
migrants," has essentially prejudged the validity of their applications,
and that the prejudgment is a product of political considerations that
look more to the foreign policy objectives of the United States than
to the merits of the particµlar application. They further object to proposals to reduce prncedural PlOtections for asylum applicants. ·
The recent flooq of asylum claims, and the concerns it engenders,
are not peculiar to the United States. Western European nations have
witnessed similar increases in asylum applications over the past decade,
.and institutions charged with adjudicating claims have become severely
overburdened. This Article will describe the experience of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Republic of France irt coping with the
explosion of asylum claims. A comparative analysis may provide
perspective on the American situation and perhaps suggest - or rule
out - proposals for change currently under consideration in the United
S,tates.15 To appreciate the saliency of the German and French
13. Martin, supra note l, at ll2.
14. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 380, n.37 (C.D. Cal. 1982); cf. P.
Weiss-Fagen, Applying for Political Asylum in New York: Law, Policy and Administrative Practice
15, 19, 24, 31 (Oct. 7, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (documenting numerous instances where
the government has presumed that certain asylum applicants are "economic migrants"); Aleinikoff,
Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237,
251-55 (1983).
15. The proposal currently receiving the most attention is The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1983, S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S6970 (daily ed. May 18, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Simpson-Mazzoli]. The legislation would require that asylum claims be heard
by specially trained immigration judges. § 124(a)(2). The immigration judge's decision would
be appealable to a newly created United States Immigration Board, § 124(a)(3)(D), which could
overturn a decision only if it were not supported by substantial evidence. § l07(b)(4).
Judicial review of the Immigration Board's decisions would be limited to questions of jurisdic-
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experiences, it is first necessary to review in greater detail the asylum
process in this country.
l.

AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

The Numbers

The number of asylum claims filed in INS district offices, as reported
by the INS, is indicated in table 1. 16
tion and procedure, the constitutionality of the law and regulations under which determinations
were made, and whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. § 123(a)(5)(B). Finally, the
bill would limit the role of the State Department in asylum adjudications to providing regular
information regarding human_ rights conditions in other countries for the use of immigration
judges and making discretionary comments on individual asylum claims so long as they do not
delay adjudication. § 123(a)(3)(C). See generally Simpson-Mazzoli, supra, §§ 123-124; S. REP.
No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-39 (1983).
The Senate passed the Simpson-Mazzoli bill on May 18, 1983, but it has not yet reached the
floor of the House of Representatives. Its fate remains uncertain.
Other proposals for reform of the asylum process have been advanced by immigration experts.
For example, Ira Kurzban has advocated the elimination of the role of the INS District Director
and, in most cases, the State Department in asylum adjudications. In addition, he has suggested
easing the applicant's burden of proof and establishing more lenient time limitations on the filing
and perfecting of asylum applications. Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 91 (1981).
Deborah Anker and Michael Posner have proposed that immigration officials be specially trained
to handle asylum claims. They also have advocated allowing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to render advisory opinions on individual cases and aid in training immigration officials. They have further recommended the establishment of a "Board for
Determination of Refugee Status and Asylum" composed of representatives of the executive
branch, UNHCR, and private and church-related agencies. The Board would oversee the implementation of the Refugee Act, help develop and clarify asylum standards and procedures,
and review asylum claims deemed frivolous by the INS district office. Finally, they have suggested elimination of ideological biases in current asylum statutes, regulations, and procedures.
Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 9 (1981).
Arthur Helton has made several proposals for the depoliticization of the asylum process, including involvement of the UNHCR, a more limited role for the State Department, and more
balanced and comprehensive training for immigration judges. See Helton, supra note 1.
16. Although these are the official numbers provided by the INS, there is little reason to
believe that they reflect the precise number of claims filed. First, the INS only counts those
claims filed with INS district offices. This means that claims initially filed before immigration
judges in exclusion or deportation hearings are not included. Although the EOIR, since its creation in early 1983, has recorded the number of claims filed before immigration judges, it does
not break down the data into those claims filed previously with the INS and those claims first
filed with an immigration judge (and thus never seen by the INS). Accordingly, one cannot simply
add the number of cases filed with the INS and filed before immigration judges to obtain an
accurate count.
Second, over the past several years the INS has used different means to count claims, at times
counting "cases" and at other times counting "persons." Because a "case" may include several
persons or family members, figures for years when "cases" were counted cannot accurately be
compared with figures for years when "persons" were counted.
Third, and most troubling, is the high probability that the INS's "count" is carried out in
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TABLE 1
ASYLUM CLAIMS FILED IN INS DISTRICT OFFICES, 1978-1984

Fiscal Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Oct. 1983-Mar. 1984

Number
3,702
5,801
15,955
61,568
33,246
26,091
13,419

Each year, case filings have substantially exceeded case closings; and
there are presently pending before the INS probably about 160,000
cases. 11 To some extent this is a misleading figure, because it includes
approximately 120,000 cases that the government does not intend to
adjudicate - primarily undocumented Cubans and Haitians who are
likely to be given lawful status under legislation presently pending before
Congress. 11 Although this fact undercuts the dire picture usually painted

a haphazard fashion. See INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 25 n. •. No centralized record
of filings exists. Given the low priority that asylum claims have been assigned during the last
decade, many remain ignored or buried in district offices. That the INS may overlook large
numbers of claims is graphically illustrated by the recent "recount" of Cuban claims. On October
1, 1982, the INS reported the number of pending asylum cases filed by Cubans as 51,026. Between October and May 1983, 636 new claims were filed, 5,181 claims were reported "transferred in," 1,495 were "transferred out," see infra for a discussion of these terms, and 184 were
adjudicated or closed. These data would lead one to expect that in May 1983 the number of
pending Cuban claims would be around 60,000. Yet, the INS reported a total of JJ6,442 claims
pending. This huge leap resulted from a special recount requested by the INS central office.
The INS has not, however, explained how more than 50,000 claims could have originally gone
uncounted; the error is simply indicated in INS records as an "adjustment."
Fourth, interpretation of the data categories seems to vary from district to district. For example, INS asylum records include categories labeled as "transferred in" and "transferred out."
In some district offices these terms are understood as applying to cases transferred from one
INS office to another. In other offices, a case is deemed "transferred out" when an applicant
requests his file back (either to withdraw the claim or add information).
·
These considerations force one to view skeptically any figures supplied by the government
regarding asylum, and, derivatively, the United States data reported in this Article. The numbers
should be seen as interesting primarily for the trends they display.
17. The astute reader may notice that the number of claims filed for the last six years as
reported in Table One (totaling 159,782) is nearly equal to the present number pending, even
though thousands of claims have been adjudicated. This "discrepancy" is due to the 50,000
Cuban claims discovered in the 1983 recount, see supra note 16, and the fact that thousands
of claims were pending at the end of fiscal year 1977.
18. Under the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation, supra note 15, Cubans who entered during the
Mariel boatlift and Haitians who had filed asylum claims or were involved in INS proceedings
as of December 31, 1980 would be granted the status of "lawfully admitted for temporary
residence." INS records indicate that at the end of fiscal year 1983, 116,422 Cuban and 5,494
Haitian claimants would be eligible for this status.
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by the executive and legislative branches of government, 19 a backlog
of over 40,000 cases before the INS cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Moreover, a substantial number of new claims arrive each month,
and it is likely that thousands of additional claims could surface if
INS enforcement activities inside the United States were steppe,d up. 20

B.

The Procedures

The large increase in asylum claims would not necessarily be cause
for alarm if adequate procedures existed to adjudicate them. Unfortunately, this is not' the case.
Formally, asylum claims are filed either with an INS district office
or, if the alien is subject to an exclusion or deportation hearing, with
an immigration judge. 21 In the district office, the alien is usually called
in for an interview; if the claim is made to an immigration judge, the
alien is entitled to a hearing. The alien's application is sent by the district
office or the immigration judge to the State Department's Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs for an "advisory opinion"
on the conditions in the alien's homeland. 22 If the district office denies
an application for asylum, there is no administrative review; the alien
may, however, reassert the claim before an immigration judge in a
subsequent exclusion or deportation hearing. 23 A denial by an immigration judge may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
and to a federal court. 24
1. Delay- This structure raises obvious opportunities for delay,
and administrative practices virtually ensure it. Claims filed with district
19. See, e,g., Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Joint Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm~
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings] (testimony'
, of Attorney General William French Smith) ("[O]ur policy and procedures for dealing with asylum
applicants, which have been genero\Is and deliberate, have crumbled under the burden of overwhelming numbers."); S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (report on the SimpsonMazzoli legislation); see also INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 61.
20. For example, the Congressional Research Service estimates that 60,000 to 500,000
Salvadorans currently live illegally in the United States. C. JONES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH ,
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. Poucy TowARDs UNDOCUMENTED SALVADORANS (Mini Brief
Number MB82223 July 20, 1982). Attempting to deport these individuals would cause many
to file for asylum.
21. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1983), as amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 5885 (1983).
22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9, 208.10 (1983).
24. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.7, 242.21 (1983). Adverse decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in deportation cases may be appealed directly to a United States Court of Appeals.
If the asylum claim is made in an exclusion hearing, the BIA's decision may be reviewed only
through a habeas corpus proceeding in a United States District Court. INA § 106, 8 U.S.C.
§ i 105(a) (1982).
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. offices are not handled in a uniform or centralized manner. Some offices
have thousands of claims while others have only a few. 25 Within the
district offices, asylum claims are viewed as difficult, unrewarding cases
and are often assigned to junior INS officers. Until recently, the
.bureaucracy put no special emphasis on processing asylum claims, and
simply left thousands of claims at the bottom of the work pile. Aliens
and their lawyers often put no pressure on officials to process claims,
particularly where claims are filed primarily to forestall deportation .
. An INS study estimates that forty to eighty percent of the applicants
do not appear for scheduled interviews. It attributes the high no-show
rate to the alien's desire, in some cases, not to be located, and the
INS's failure to process change of address forms. 26
Recent efforts by the INS have made some headway in clearing the
backlog out of district offices. 21 But this has merely shifted some of
the burden up the decision-making chain to the fifty-five immigration
judges. New filings before immigration judges are averaging between
300 and 500 a month, and only one case is adjudicated for every two
filed. The best estimate of the total number of asylum cases. presently
before immigration judges is between 8,000 and 10,000. 28 When one
25. An INS survey dated October 13, 1983 reports the number of claims pending at the eight
district offices with the greatest nurµber of claims:
Claims Pending as of Oct. 13, 1983

All Claims (Including
Cubans/Haitians)
Miami
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Houston
New York
Washington,· D.C.
Chicago ·
Newark

112,749
11,582
9,098
5,263
2,747
1,298
4,882
9,429
157,048

Non-Cuban/
Haitian Claims.,
13,205
'10,895
8,240
4,718
2,605
1,201
902
738
42,504

The number of claims pending before these offices accounts for 92% of the 171,402 claims reported
pending at the end of fiscal year 1983.
26. INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 40.
27. The State Department has also made progress in reducing delays in the issuance of its
advisory opinions. Due to a commitment of additional resources, the Office of Asylum Affairs
is now "current" with its asylum caseload. Letter from W. Scott Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to author (Oct. 24, 1982).
28. Surprisingly, the government has no precise count of the number of cases presently pending before immigration judges. Following the creation of the EOIR, records have been maintained on the number of new filings before immigration judges. These indicate that between
300 and 600 asylum cases per month have been received since February 1983. Because filings
outnumber adjudications by about two to one, the backlog is likely to grow each year by about
3,000 cases. The 8,000-10,000 .estimate is arrived at by multiplying this annual accumulation
by four .,.... the number of years immigration judges have had jurisdiction ove~ asylum cases
- and di~counting somewhat for a low level of filings in the first and second years.
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adds to these cases the more than 100,000 deportation and exclusion
cases filed before immigration judges in fiscal year 1983, 29 it is apparent that many pending asylum claims will not be adjudicated for
quite some time. Further delay, of course, will be occasioned by review
of the immigration judges' decisions at the BIA and in the courts.
These cumbersome procedures and practices have been further complicated by several important judicial decisions that have imposed
substantial limitations 30 on immigration officials in response to
overzealous governmental attempts to expedite the adjudication of
claims 31 or to deter the filing of claims. 32 Unfortunately, the case records
demonstrate disturbing government policies aimed at reducing the
backlog of claims without ensuring accurate determinations. 33 Thus the
courts were correct to step in to enjoin conduct that violated the Constitution and federal statutes. 34 But the result has clearly increased the
adjudication time for asylum claims.
The current procedural and practical delays are troubling for several
reasons. First, the delay caused by multiple levels of review is costly,
and asylum proceedings take time and resources from other immigration and judicial work. We may be willing to bear this cost for
humanitarian reasons; but it is clear that the total cost of the current
process is not one that Congress consciously opted for when it passed
the Refugee Act.
Second, the crush of applications and ensuing delay may lead administrative agencies to adopt programs that sacrifice fair adjudication for an expedited processing of claims. This in fact occurred ·in
1978 when the INS decided it was time to clear up a backlog of Haitian
claims that had accumulated over several years. The result was
disastrous. Haitians were run through a process that was grossly un29. 60 Interpreter Releases 844 (1983) (quoting petition for certiorari filed by the government
in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984} (No. 83-491)}.
30. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin,
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982); Louis v. Meissner,
530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981), modified, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Haitian Refugee
Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
For analysis of some of these opinions, see Note, Protecting Aliens from Persecution Without
Overloading the INS: Should Illegal Aliens Receive Notice of the Right to Apply for Asylum,
69 VA. L. REV. 901, 905-13 (1983).
31. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982).
32. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin,
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
33. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
speed alone with which the entire program was pursued undermined the probability that a record
could be assembled to afford a basis for informed decisionmaking."); id. at 1030-32.
34. For arguments that the courts went too far, see Martin, Due Process and Membership
in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165, 169-71
(1983); Note, supra note 30, at 908, 916, 929.
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fair and one that, ironically, left the government no better off than
it had been before the program: a federal court appalled at the conduct ordered the government to adjudicate the claims again. 35
Finally, the long delays now extant in the process may spark the
filing of additional claims. Obvious incentives are created if aliens know
that they will not be deported until all avenues of review are exhausted.
This potential reward to an alien with a frivolous asylum claim may
quickly lead to a vicious circle: the greater the number of frivolous
claims, the greater the backlog; the greater the backlog, the greater
the delay in adjudications; the greater the delay, the greater the incentive to file frivolous claims.
Whether such a vicious circle now exists is a matter of dispute. The
government has asserted that much of the huge increase in filings is
due to abuse of the system by "economic migrants" who take advantage of the current delays to further their stay in the United States.
Without specific empirical evidence (which, to my knowledge, does
not yet exist), it is difficult to evaluate this claim. However, several
factors cast doubt upon the government's position.
First is the fact that the vast bulk of pending claims are filed by
aliens from co_untries where persecution is a realistic possibility. Over
ninety percent of the claims involve aliens from Cuba, Iran, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Poland, Afghanistan, the People's Republic of China,
Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, and Lebanon. 36 These, excepting El Salvador,
are not the primary countries of origin of undocumented workers in
the United States. 37 If the asylum process were being overwhelmed by
"economic migrants," one might expect the source countries of aliens
filing claims to be quite different. Of course, these data do not disprove
that many of those who have filed claims are "economic migrants."
It is possible that aliens use the asylum process as a delaying tactic
only if their home countries are within the category of those from which_
35. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F .2d 1023 (5th Cir.' 1982). The majority of these
claims, however, will never be adjudicated. The Simpson-Mazzoli legislation, supra note 15, would
authorize the Attorney General to adjust the status of Haitian immigrants who, as of December
31, 1980, were in the United States and had applied for asylum to that of "aliens lawfully admitted
for temporary residence." S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 30l(b); see S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 51 (1983) (emphasis in original). Expecting that this provision of Simpson-Mazzoli will
ultimately be approved, the government has not reinstituted proceedings against the Haitians
covered by the court's ruling in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith.
36. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Cases Filed with District Directors
Pursuant to Section 208 INA (June-Sept. 1982) (data compiled quarterly by INS).
37. Perhaps half of the undocumented aliens in the United States come from Mexico. The
remainder come mostly from other Latin American countries, the Caribbean, and parts of Asia,
especially the Philippines. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMJGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY' STAFF
REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 483 (1981). Based on the average
number of immigrants expelled from the United States between 1975 and 1977, the top countries
of origin of illegal aliens are Mexico, Canada, El Salvador, Greece, The Dominican Republic,
Peru, and Jamaica. M. MORRIS & A. MAYIO, CURBING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 12 (1982).
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claims have been accepted in the past. It is not obvious, however, why
aliens bent on holding off their departure would not take advantage
of the general delay involved in processing all asylum claims. The United
States has no procedure for a quick and final denial of even a patently
frivolous application. A claim from Canada is entitled to the same
procedures (and delays) as one from Kampuchea.
Rather than pointing to "economic migrants" as the primary source
of increased asylum claims, these considerations suggest that the increase is due in part (perhaps even in large part) to aliens who have
some reason to fear returning to their home countries. The cost to
an alien of applying for asylum is negligible (indeed, the alien benefits
in the short term by remaining in this country)~ and the long term
gain is potentially enormous: lawful permanent residence in the United
States. If this accurately describes some or many of the new claimants,
should we conclude the system is being abused by frivolous claims or
used by persons with potentially good claims that demand careful
scrutiny?
Other factors also undercut the government's claim that the increase
in applicants is primarily a product of abuse of the system. First, a
large number of claims in the current backlog were filed by aliens advised to do so by the INS. 38 Second, several lawsuits have halted the
adjudication of claims. 39 This in tum has inflated the number of pending
claims and ha_s contributed to the perception that the system is being
overwhelmed by frivolous claims. Finally, increased worldwide concern with human rights issues and the passage of the Refugee Act may
have made aliens (and their lawyers) more aware of the possibility of
being granted asylum. Interestingly, the great leap in filings coincided
with the passage of the Refugee Act and the Mariel boatlift. Perhaps
the Refugee Act accomplished no more than what it intended: to
transform ad hoc refugee policies into general statutory procedures and
to remove geographical and ideological limits on the deportation of
refugees. Thus aliens who in earlier years might have been granted other
forms of discretionary relief or been ineligible for refugee status now
avail themselves of the new asylum process of section 208 of the INA. 40
In sum, we simply have too little data to be able to say with any
38. Many of these claims were filed by Cubans arriving during the Mariel boatlift, Iranians
stranded by the fall of the Shah, and anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans who filed asylum claims at
the urging of the INS when "extended voluntary departure" status was withdrawn in September
1980. See Aleinikoff, supra note 14, at 254-55; INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 20-23.
39. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
40. These forms ofrelief include parole under INA§ 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(d)(5) (1982),
discussed in Helton, supra note 1, at 245-46, 248-49, and "extended voluntary departure," discussed
infra at notes 178-81 and accompanying text. Cf INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 71 (asylum
applications inevitably increase when an extended voluntary departure program for a particular
nationality is terminated).
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degree of certainty what has caused the explosion of asylum claims
in the United States. There is little reason to doubt that some percentage of aliens filing asylum claims are doing so simply to extend their
stays in the United S~ates. To deny this would be to deny too much
of what we know about human nature. But there is no evidence that
most, or even a significant number, of aliens are "abusing" the system.
Of course, resolution of the "abuse" debate will not dissolve concern
with the current asylum adjudication process. Even if every claim filed
had an even chance of succeeding, the present system would still be
lengthy, redundant, and costly and could still stimulate the filing of
less-than-certain claims.
2. The appearance of political intervention- As noted above, INS
district offices or immigration judges forward asylum claims to the
State Department's Bureau on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(BHRHA) for an "advisory" opinion on the merits of the claim. Most
INS district officials and immigration judges have neither the information, experience nor training to evaluate allegations regarding political
conditions in the alien's home country. A study of the asylum process
in New York found "a certain discomfort with asylum cases" among
the immigration judges:
They understand they will be making possible life-or-death
decisions on the basis of subjective impressions and with
minimum evidence. Several noted the presence of political factors
and pressures in asylum cases, especially with regard to the
larger, more controversial groups, e.g. Salvadorans, Haitians,
and Poles. None would elaborate on the nature of these political
factors and all asserted their independence of judgment, but
some did express that they were being obliged to make judicial
decisions which were more properly made in the political arena,
and on political grounds. For the immigration judges, as for
the examinations officers, judgments are seen as the domain
of the Department of State, and they do not acknowledge reponsibility for countering State Department country expertise, even
if they may differ with advisory opinion letters on specific
cases. 41
It is thus not surprising that in almost every case the State Department's advice is deemed conclusive. ' 2
41. P. Weiss-Fagen, supra note 14, at 16. See Scanlon, supra note 11, at 628.
42. See id. at 12-13, 34. Although Weiss-Fagen found a few cases where asylum status was
denied despite a favorable recommendation from the State Department, see id. at 13, she concludes that "there are few, if any, instances in which immigration judges in New York have
granted asylum applications when advisory opinions have recommended denials." Id.; see also
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This situation is disturbing. First, the alien is not able to make her
case to the State Department nor is she able to question State Department sources. In effect, the main event in an asylum proceeding occurs wholly outside the hearing. Equally troubling is the internal procedure of the State Department. Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliot Abrams, has described it as follows:
Each application is reviewed individually by an officer in the
Office of Asylum Affairs of [BHRHA] and then is sent to the
appropriate country desk officer in the Department. If appropriate, [BHRHA] may request an opinion from the Office
of the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S. Embassy
in the applicant's country of nationality, or, if appropriate, in
a third country. After agreement is reached between the asylum
officer in [BHRHAJ and the desk officer on the proposed recommendation to INS, the draft advisory opinion and application
file are reviewed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs in [BHRHA], and in some cases by the geographic officer
in [BHRHA] or by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asylum
and Humanitarian Affairs. It is rare for individual cases to rise
to more senior levels. The proposed recommendation then is
signed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs and
sent to INS. 43
The presentation of every asylum case to the country desk allows the
intrusion of political factors into asylum decisions since country desk
officers may have strong views about the effect that recognizing or
not recognizing claims could have on the achievement of American
foreign policy objectives. Again, there has been no empirical test of
this proposition, but the data seem to create at least an appearance
of political distortion of the asylum process. This can be seen by INS
· recognition rates for fiscal years 1982 and 1983. 44
INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 62-63 (including statement by INS official that he "would
never, never overrule the State Department.").
43. Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees
and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1983)
(prepared statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Refugee
Assistance Hearings].
44. These figures are claims adjudicated by INS district offices. No data yet exist reporting
the number of claims denied by the district office that are subsequently granted by an immigration judge or the BIA. The EOIR reports that immigration judges, since February 1983, have
granted approximately 40-5017/o of the claims they have adjudicated. Unfortunately it is not known
how many of these cases were previously denied by INS district offices. Nor have these data
been broken down on a country-by-country basis. Thus, the high approval rate is susceptible
to diverse interpretations, such as: (l) immigration judges are far more lenient in the adjudica-
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INS ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES,

Country
Afghanistan
Chile
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Haiti
Hungary
Iran
Libya
Nicaragua
Poland
USSR

1982

AND

1983

Fiscal Year 1983
Fiscal Year 1982
Granted (OJo) Denied (OJo) Granted (OJo) Denied (%)
230 (62.3)
139 (37. 7)
303 (63.7)
173 (36.3)
0 (0.0)
40 (100)
3 (13.0)
20 (87 .0)
1 (0.4) 238 (99.6)
9 (8.7)
94 (91.3)
8 (7.5)
94 (92.2)
8 (2.4)
324 (97 .6)
26 (45.6)
31 (54.4)
13 01.7)
28 (68.3)
69 (6.4) 1012 (93.6)
163 (2.4) 6576 (97.6)
249 (44.1)
316 (55.9)
213 (27 .0)
576 (73.0)
7 (5.4)
122 (94.6)
8 (5.3)
144 (94.7)
25 (18.4)
111 (81.6)
34 (23.1)
113 (76.9)
2610 (60.1) 1731 (39.9) 5080 (71.6) 2014 (28.4)
5 (15.6)
27 (84.4)
18 (62.1)
11 (37.9)
336 (25.9) 962 (74.1)
279 (9.5) 2664 (90.5)
112 (9.0) 1128 (90.5)
725 (28.5) 1815 (71.5)
14 (42.4)
19 (57.6)
36 (48.0)
39 (52.0}

These data are generally consistent with the view - with obvious
exceptions45 - that aliens seeking asylum from countries friendly to
the United States are less likely to be granted asylum than those from
countries unfriendly to the United States. Of course other explanations may also be consistent with these figures; 46 yet the appearance
of disparate treatment lingers and is supported by other circumstantial
evidence. 47
tion of claims than district offices, or (2) judges are currently adjudicating claims that have
a higher likelihood of being granted (e.g., Iranian claims filed during the hostage crisis), and
which would have been granted had they been filed in the district office ..
45. Two exceptions are Cuba and Poland. The low approval rates here may be explained
by other factors. The claims of most of the 125,000 Cubans who entered during the Mariel boatlift
are not being adjudicated. The government is, however, adjudicating claims of persons it would
like to return to Cuba, such as persons who have committed serious crimes in Cuba or the United
States. As for claimants from Poland, the approval rate is quite low when compared to the
traditional treatment of Eastern European asylum seekers. See Helton, supra note I, at 253.
Yet none of the Poles denied asylum is being returned. All have been granted "extended voluntary departure," a status which permits them to remain indefinitely in the United States.
46. For example, the figures might be explained under a view that the United States has
friendly relations only with countries that are relatively free of persecution and serious human
rights violations. This hypothesis, however, is belied by the State Department's own evaluation
of some friendly nations. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 98TH CONG., !ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, at 432-44 (Jt. Comm. Print 1983) (Chile); id. at 490-506
(El Salvador); id. at 544-53 (Haiti).
47. The disparate treatment accorded deportable Salvadorans and Poles in the United States
is a graphic example. Poles, although denied asylum in large numbers, have regularly been granted
"extended voluntary departure." The government, however, has refused to accord such treatment to Salvadorans despite a congressional recommendation that review of claims for such status
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Summary

The preceding discussion has identified a number of problems confronting the current asylum system in the United States. These include
a higher than expected rate of filings, significant delays in the adjudication of claims, the possibility that delays stimulate the filing of additional marginal claims, the presence of inadequately trained administrative decision makers, and the appearance that political factors
influence asylum decisions. These problems are not unique to the United
States. In both France and Germany the number of asylum applications has increased dramatically in recent years and institutions charged
with deciding claims have become intolerably overburdened. Government officials in both countries believe that aliens with "frivolous"
claims of political persecution are "abusing" the asylum process in
order to circumvent strict restrictions on immigration of workers. West
Germany has recently enacted major changes in its asylum procedures
and has adopted far tougher policies regarding benefits available to
applicants. France may be on the brink of doing so. The next two
parts of this Article will detail these developments.
II.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A.

The Problem 48

West Germany began to experience a large increase in asylum applications in the mid-1970's. For the years 1970 to 1973, the number
of claims ranged between approximately 5200 and 8600 per year. From
1974 to 1980, filings grew geometrically, as table 3 demonstrates:

continue on a case-by-case basis. International Security and Development Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-113, § 731, 95 Stat. 1519, 1557. This allegedly discriminatory practice has been challenged
in Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983). Haitians
have also been victimized by disparate treatment. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983),
dismissed in part, rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (I Ith Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). For
other examples, see Helton, supra note 1, at 256-57. See generally AssocIATION OF TIIE BAR OF
TIIE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL
AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (Apr. 1984 draft) ("asylum 'crisis' lies not in increasing numbers
of asylum seekers, but in. the foreign and domestic policy considerations which have invaded
the process").
48. For an ~verview, see the collection of articles in G. SCHULZ, E!NWANDERUNGSLAND
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1982); Kim111inich, Eine neue Runde in der Asylrechts-Diskussion,
DER STAAT, 21/1982, at 505-26.
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TABLE 3' 9

ASYLUM CLAIMS FILED IN WEST GERMANY,

Year

Number

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983(est.)

5,595
9,424
9,627
11,123
16,410
33,136
51,493
107,818
49,301
37,423
20,000

1973-1983

At the outset, it is crucial to distinguish among reasons why an alien
chooses to leave his home country and why he decides to go to Germany. In some cases these may be the same: to join family or to work
for higher wages. But aliens may also decide to emigrate to escape
persecution or an oppressive political system. These aliens may choose
Germany as a country of resettlement for economic reasons, but it
would be a mistake to say that they left their home countries for
economic reasons or to label them "economic refugees." Thus, although
it is clear that aliens choose to file asylum claims in Germany largely
for economic considerations, this, by itself, may say little about the
merit of most asylum claims.
Foremost among the causes contributing to the increase in asylum
claims are restrictions on the immigration of foreign laborers. The rise
in asylum applications coincides with the ending of the German guest
worker program in 1973, which had brought several million foreigners
to Germany since the early 1960's. so The closing of the program forced
aliens seeking employment to find other avenues for entering and remaining in Germany. The asylum process became one such route.
The interrelationship between termination of the guest worker program and the subsequent rise in asylum claims is best seen in the case
49. Data assembled from Bericht des Innenministeriums von Baden-Wuerttemberg zu
Auslaenderfragen (August 1981) and Auskunft der Minister Jue Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales
des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Sept. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Auskunft der Minister
juer Arbeit); see also von Pollern, Die Entwicklung der Asylbewerberzahlen im Jahre 1981,
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLAENDERRECHT UND AusLAENDERPOLITIK [ZAR),

2/1982, at 93.

See Hoenekopp & Ullman, The status of immigrant workers in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in IMMIGRANl' WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS (E. Thomas ed. 1982). Be50.

tween 1961 and 1979, the foreign population in Germany increased by more than 6000Jo, from
686,000 (l.20Jo of the total population) to 4.14 million (6.8%). Id. at 127.
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of Turks. More than a million Turkish citizens entered Germany under
the guest worker system. Economic opportunities in Germany, combined with the high level of civil violence in Turkey in the 1970's, contributed to the labor flow. The ending of lawful immigration placed
a roadblock on a well-trod thoroughfare. Accordingly, thousands of
Turks turned to the asylum process: in 1980 Turks filed over half of
the almost 108,000 applications. 51
Political upheaval in sending countries has been a cause of the rise
in filings. Although the number of Turks requesting asylum has dropped since 1980, 52 applications from aliens from Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
and Poland have increased. 53 Each of these nations has witnessed serious
political turmoil in the past few years.
West German policies regarding work and social benefits also contributed to the increased filings. Until recent dramatic changes, asylum
applicants were given permission to work during the pendency of their
claims. 54 Those unable to find work were eligible for welfare payments. 55
Applicants were also entitled to medical benefits and were permitted
to travel freely in Germany and settle where they chose. Obviously,
so long as aliens viewed West Germany as a place to find better work
than they could find at home, the treatment afforded asylum applicants
served as a strong magnet to attract them.
If these policies virtually invited aliens to apply, the West German
legal system ensured them a lengthy time to enjoy the benefits. yhe
right to asylum 56 and judicial review of administrative determinations 57
are secured by the German Constitution. As implemented by statutes,
these constitutional provisions formerly gave rise to administrative and
judicial proceedings that regularly took three to five years to complete
51. von Pollern, supra note 49, at 93.
52. In 1981, 12.3% of the new asylum applicants were Turkish. The drop is probably a result
of relative civil stability in Turkey following the September 1980 military coup, new restrictive
German policies, see infra notes 67-96 and accompanying text, and a worsening German economy.
53. See DER SPIEGEL, 31/1981, at 60; DER SPIEGEL, 43/1981, at 46.
54. Runderlass der Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit Nr. 135/75 vom 13. Maerz 1975.
55. Bundessozialhilfegesetz art. 120 (Federal Social Welfare Law); see R. MARX,
AUSLAENDERGESETZ UND ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ 478 (3d ed. 1982).
56. "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum." GRUNDGESETZ
[GG] art. 16, sec. 2 (W. Ger.). This provision was included in recognition of the importance
of asylum to Germans fleeing Nazi persecution. See Paul, Asylrecht im Zwielicht?, ZAR, 4/1982,
at 184-87; Asylverfahrensgesetz, Bundestagsdrucksache 9/875 official commentary (1982), reprinted
in KLOESEL & CHRIST, DEUTSCHES AUSLAENDERRECHT, AsYLRECHT Bl.
On the scope of and limits on the right of asylum, see T. MAUNZ, G. DuERIG & R. HERZOG,
GRUNDGESETZ K0MMENTAR (5th ed. 1983) (marginal notes 43-50 to art. 16). Detailed explanations and references to major court opinions can be found in W. KANEIN, AusLAENDERGESETZ
KoMMENTAR 214-26 (3d ed. 1980) (commentary to Auslaendergesetz art. 28), and in KL0ESEL
& CHRIST, supra (commentary to Asylverfahrensgesetz art. I).
57. Art. 19, sec. 4. For the scope and implications of this provision, see T. MAUNZ, G. DUERIG
& R. HERZOG, supra note 56 (commentary to GG art. 19, sec. 4).
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and often took much longer. 58 The legal process itself, therefore, created
incentives for potential asylum claimants: whether or not one's claim
was ultimately granted, the process promised to take so long that even
aliens with patently frivolous claims would be guaranteed a long stay
in Germany.
Finally, policies regarding the return of persons denied asylum have
also been a factor in the rise of applications. In West Germany, the
states (Laender) have the responsibility for enforcing federal immigration laws. 59 Authorities located in cities and districts, under the supervision of the state Ministry of the Interior, register aliens and grant
them residence cards. They are also responsible for the deportation
of aliens unlawfully in the country, including aliens denied refugee status
by the federal government. 60 Under this authority, the Laender have
developed flexible policies that allow aliens presenting compelling
humanitarian concerns or coming from certain countries to remain in
the state even though their asylum claims have been denied. 61 Thus,
in 1966, the Interior Ministers of all the Laender formally agreed not
to return any alien from a Warsaw Pact nation. Other Laender have
made unilateral decisions not to return Afghanis, Lebanese or Christian Turks. Persons in these groups are "tolerated" in the Laender
for approximately a year and then are given official immigrant status
with the granting of a residence card. These policies are likely to attract aliens irrespective of the ultimate merit of their asylum claims.
B.

Statutory .and Policy Changes

As in the United States, the German government viewed with alarm
the rise in the number of asylum applications. Not only did the flood
of claims seriously overburden existing adjudicatory procedures, but
government officials also believed that many of the new applications
were frivolous and made simply for the purpose of prolonging the aliens'
time in Germany. 62 This view is typified by the following statement
of the federal Ministry of Interior:
A wide gap between the socio-economic situations of different
58. See Antwort der Bundesregierung vom. 20. Juni 1980 auf eine grosse Anfrage,
Bundestagsdrucksache 8/4279 (1980), at 3 [hereinafter cited as Antwort der Bundesregierung];
Meyer-Ladewig, Vereinfachung und Beschleunigung verwa/tungsgerichtlicher Verfahren, 0EUTSCHES
VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVB!), 14/1979, at 542.
59. Under article 83 of the Grundgesetz, the Laender perform all executive functions absent
special provisions assigning them to the federal government.
60. Auslaendergesetz art. 20, 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] I 353 (W. Ger.) (Alien's Law).
61. This practice is quite similar to the American nonreturn policy known as "extended voluntary departure."
62. See DER SPIEGEL, 25/1980, at 32.
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nations and the greater facilities existing nowadays for travel
and information result in the fact that constantly growing
numbers of people try, by baseless reference to the right of
asylum, to enter an industrialized country for at least a temporary stay for the purpose of getting a job. 63
High-ranking government authorities substantiate the claim of abuse
of the system by noting instances of aliens who arrive with one-way
airplane tickets and applications for asylum filled out by attorneys they
have never met. They further state that fraudulent papers and identities are not uncommon, that stories of persecution often appear
manufactured, and that dozens of applications may be filed by a single
lawyer alleging essentially the same facts for every alien from a particular country. Finally, they note that in recent years approximately
ninety percent of all claims have been rejected. 64
It is difficult to evaluate the claim that the huge increase in applications is due primarily to abuse of the system. Lawyers and groups
representing the applicants acknowledge that some frivolous claims undoubtedly are filed, but they maintain that the government has
overstated the level of abuse. These advocates assert that the ninety
percent rejection rate does not mean that ninety percent of the claims
are abusive or frivolous; in many cases aliens may be unable to document persecution satisfactorily or may have a well-founded fear of returning to their countries that does not come within the narrow legal
definition of "refugee" under German and international law. They
charge that the labeling of asylum applicants as "abusers" is simply
one aspect of a general unwillingness of Germany to welcome aliens,
particularly those from non-European nations. 6 '
No matter which side is closer to the truth in this debate, it is clear
that the perception of abuse created the impetus for major policy
changes. Furthermore, state governments, who had the obligation of
providing for the asylum applicants while the seemingly interminable
federal adjudication process took its course, 66 applied pressure on the
63. THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, COMMENTS ON THE [UNHCR] REPORT DATED
JULY 1983 ON THE SITUATION OF AsYLUM-SEEKERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, Para.
3.3 (third unnumbered page) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL MINISTRY
COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPORT).
64. VON POLLERN, supra note 49, at 94.
65. See DER SPIEGEL, 21/1981, at 36; DER SPIEGEL, 26/1981, at 81. West Germany's unwillingness to accept refugees is also evidenced by its failure to adopt a program such as those in
the United States and France, for taking in refugees from around the world. Responding to
this contention, the government points out that Germany accepted some 20,000 "boat people"
in 1980. Critics, however, maintain that this was the only time Germany has adopted such a
policy and that it did so only after international pressure was applied.
66. As to the social, financial and political impact of the asylum problem on the Laender,
see DER SPIEGEL, 49/1981, at 46; DER SPIEGEL, 35/1981, at 38; DER SPIEGEL, 32/1981, at 26.
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federal government to adopt restrictive measures. These factors produced dramatic policy modifications that (1) made it more difficult
for potential asylum applicants to get to Germany, (2) ended work
and benefit policies that attracted immigrants, and (3) expedited the
adjudication process.
1. Visa requirement- An alien wishing to enter Germany to work
or to stay longer than three months must have a visa, unless her country of origin is exempted from the visa requirement. In 1980, the government removed a number of nations from the list of exempt countries.
The countries removed were those that have been the primary sending
countries of the asylum applicants: Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Sri
Lanka, and Bangladesh. 67 Airlines are prohibited from carrying persons from these countries unless they hold valid visas. The clear purpose and impact of the regulation is to prevent applicants from arriving in West Germany where they can make their claim for asylum. 68
Lawyers who represent asylum applicants charge that the visa restrictions are grossly overbroad because they prevent bona fide refugees
from reaching Germany. They assert that politically persecuted persons in certain countries - particularly Afghanistan - will either not
be able to get to a German consulate or will not take the risk of being
seen requesting a refugee visa. Thus they claim that, whatever the
original purpose of the visa rules, these rules are now being maintained
as part of a general anti-refugee, anti-alien program. Government officials nonetheless respond that the visa requirements have been effective
in stopping the influx of economic immigrants and that "real refugees"
who truly fear political persecution will always find a way to leave
their countries.
2. Work rules- In 1980, the government fundamentally altered
its position on granting asylum applicants permission to work. Under
rules presently enforced, applicants from non-Eastern European countries may not receiye work permits for two years after arrival in Germany;
Eastern Europeans are eligible for permits in one year. 69 Although the

67. BGBl I 371 (Mar. 26, 1980); BGBl I 564 (May 12, 1980); BGBl I 782 (July 1, 1980);
BGBl I 960 (July 11, 1980).
68. Government officials recognize that a large loophole exists in the visa requirements because
West Germany does not control the border between East and West Berlin. Thus, aliens have
discovered that they may fly to East Berlin and simply walk into West Berlin where they may
claim asylum.
69. Verordnung zur Aenderung der Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung art. 1, sec. 2, 1981 BGBI I
1042 (W. Ger.), reprinted in P. BAUMUELLER, ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ KOMMENTAR 204 (1983).
One state - Baden-Wuerttemberg - has prohibited applicants from working at any time. The
state is able to do this by stamping on an applicant's identity papers that he or she is not permitted to work. Thus, although the federal government officially regulates labor supply for the
nation, the role of the states in enforcing the immigration laws gives them power to go beyond
the federal rules.
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government views the work permit rules as an important aspect of its
asylum policy, there are obviously costs attached to it. First, if applicants do not earn money working, the financial burden on the
Laender governments is greater in terms of providing funds for housing, clothing, food, and other essentials. 10 (State officials maintain that
this maintenance cost is still considerably less than the unemployment
benefits it would have to pay German workers who would lose jobs
if applicants were permitted to work.) Second, many aliens are believed
to obtain illegal employment despite sanctions against employers who
hire aliens without a work permit. One state official estimated that
an employer may save one-half to one-third by employing an applicant without a work permit because the employer pays a lower wage
to the illegal worker and avoids high payroll taxes. These savings are
likely to be greater than the noncriminal fine that would be assessed
against the employer, even assuming adequate enforcement of the law. 11
3. Relocation and distribution of asylum applicants- The major
legislative response to the increase in asylum claims was the Asylum
Procedure Act, passed by the Bundestag in 1982. 72 At the demand of
a number of states that were particularly burdened by the arrival of
large numbers of applicants, the federal government adopted a formula for allocating asylum applicants among the Laender on a percentage basis, roughly determined by the population and resources of each
state. 73 For example, under the formula, Baden-Wuerttemberg is
allocated fifteen percent of all German asylum applicants. Since only
about five percent of the applicants file their claims in BadenWuerttemberg, it must accept applicants from other states until it reaches
its statutory quota.
4. Communal housing facilities- Section 23 of the 1982 statute
The government is considering a proposal that would deny work permits to all non-East European applicants pending adjudication of their claims. ZAR, 4/1982, at 166.
Because of an agreement by the Laender not to return Eastern Europeans whether or not
they are granted asylum, the one-year work ban is a hardship for Eastern Europeans who want
to start a new life in Germany. Accordingly, local authorities may sometimes tell the Eastern
Europeans not to apply for asylum so that the work prohibition will not apply. These persons
may be given temporary documents which will permit them to work; after a year they are grant<;d
permanent residence cards.
70. To lessen this burden, some states and localities have begun providing benefits in kind
rather than cash. Furthermore, in some areas, applicants are required to perform unpaid or lowpaying community work in order to receive welfare benefits. This policy of "workfare" is a
part of German welfare law that applies generally to German welfare recipients; but it is particularly controversial as applied to asylum applicants who are otherwise prevented from working. The majority of courts have upheld such policies. See, e.g., Decision of the Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg, DVBl, 17/1982, at 849.
71. Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz art. 229, 1969 BGBI I 582 (W. Ger.); 1981 BGBI I 1390 (W.
Ger.) provides a maximum penalty of approximately $20,000.
72. Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asy!VfG], 1982 BGBI I 5702 (W. Ger.).
73. See Asy!VfG art. 22, sec. 2.
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recommends that the Laender keep asylum applicants in Gemeinschaftsunterkunjten (loosely translated as "communal housing facilites").
The Laender have adopted various programs in response to the federal
recommendation. Baden-Wuerttemberg requires most aliens who have
filed claims since the new law - presently about 1,750 - to live in
such facilities. North Rhine-Westphalia is the only state with no such
facilities; applicants there live on their own or in public housing. 74
State officials defend the housing program on several grounds. They
state that it is less expensive to house applicants iri communal
living facilities than to pay rent for private quarters. The facilities also
m~ke it easier for state authorities to locate applicants. Furthermore,
as reported by one state official, a primary goal of the housing policy
is deterrence: assignment to a housing facility may dissuade new arrivals and also lead applicants presently in Germany to abandon their
claims and return home.
The maintenance of communal living quarters for applicants, not
surprisingly, is quite controversial. State officials are careful to stress
that the facilities are not detention camps: applicants are free to come
and go. In fact, a Baden-Wuerttemberg official reported that perhaps
twenty percent of the applicants assigned to the housing leave and do
not return .. Many applicants have little choice but to remain, however,
because free meals and lodging are available only at the facility. Critics
assert that the facilities crowd people of many different cultures together
with little or no privacy, that dining programs violate dietary rules of
some of the applicants, and that the small monthly cash allowances
granted to applicants are inadequate."
The treatment of applicants in the facilities created a diplomatic flap
in the fall of 1983. After a visit to Germany, an official in the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
drafted an internal report quite critical of the condition in the facilities.
The report, which was leaked to the press, was assailed by the German
government as polemical and incorrect. The Minister of Interior also
announced he would not receive United Nations High Commissioner
Paul Hartling on a scheduled visit until the report was corrected. 76 This
incident g:raphically demonstrates the continuing controversy surrounding the decision to house applicants in communal facilities and the sensitivity of the German government on the issue.

Auskunft der Minister fuer Arbeit, supra note 49, at 4 .
See, e.g., O0KUMENTATI0N DES PRESSEDIENSTES DES SEKRETARIATS DER DEUTSCHEN B1sCH0FSK0NFERENZ, Nr. 16/80 (Sept. 7, I 980).
76. Kohl nennt Hartlings Bericht ueber die Asylpolitik Banns Unertraeglich, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 16, 1983, at 2.
74.
. 75.
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Procedural Changes11

1. The existing adjudication processa. The administrative authorities- As in the United States, asylum
applicants are afforded an administrative determination of their claims
followed by several levels of judicial review. But the German and
American systems differ in material and important respects.
Asylum applications are initially made to the local alien authorities,
who, in nearly all cases, send them to the Bundesamt fuer die Anerkennung auslaendischer Fluechtling (Federal Agency for the Recognition
of Foreign Refugees). The Bundesamt, located outside of Nuernberg
in Zirndorf, is charged with adjudicating the claim. The agency is under
the supervision of the Federal Interior Ministry, but its determination
of asylum claims is, by law, independent. The adjudication of asylum
claims is the only task of the Bundesamt; it is not charged with hearing exclusion or deportation cases, as are immigration judges in the
United States.
The adjudication procedures at the Bundesamt fall somewhere between the informal process of INS district offices and the formal hearing held before an immigration judge. Every asylum applicant must
be given an interview. 78 Although in the past the agency conducted
all interviews at its headquarters in Zirndorf, the Bundesamt recently
opened eight permanent suboffices in other cities in West Germany
where it conducts interviews. 79 Decisions by the Bundesamt are based
upon the interview and the applicant's file. The file usually includes
the statement given by the applicant to the local authorities in the
Laender, a copy of the applicant's passport, fingerprints (to catch multiple applications), and, for the majority of cases, a letter from the alien's
lawyer detailing the factual and legal basis of the claim. Ten to fifteen
77. For a discussion of the recent statutory changes, see Hanisch, Grenefragen des Asylrechts
und des allgemeinen Auslaenderrechts: DVB!, 8/1983, at 415; Henkel, Zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes
ueber das Asylverfahren, ZAR, 2/3/1981, at 85; Maurer, Probleme des Entwurfs eines Asylverfahrensgesetzes, Dm OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG [DOEV), 11/1982, at 421; Meissner, Das neue
Asy[verfahrensrecht, VERWALTUNGSBLAETTER FUER BADEN WUERTTEMBERG, 12/1982, at 385, and
1/1983, at 9; Pagenkopf, Die Neuregelung des Asylverfahrensrechts, Ueberblick, NEUE VERWALTUNGSZEITSCHRIFT, 11/1982, at 590; Reermann, Das Asylverfahrensgesetz vom 16. Juli /982,
ZAR, 3/1982, at 127.
78. During the years in which the number of applications was rising exponentially, thousands
of claims were denied without a hearing. See Schlink & Wieland, Klagebegehren und Spruchreife
im Asylverfahren, DOEV, 11/1982, at 426. This breakdown in process produced a provision
in the 1982 law that guarantees applicants a hearing before the Bundesamt, unless it is clear
that asylum should be granted or the applicant has failed to attend a scheduled hearing without
an adequate excuse. AsylVfG art. 12, sec. 4.
79. This development is likely to increase the number of applicants who will be represented
by lawyers at their hearings and will also save the Laender the cost of paying the applicants'
fare to Zirndorf.
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percent of the applicants bring lawyers to Zirndorf; legal representation is not provided by the government. Bundesamt adjudicators
specialize in one, two, or three countries and are supervised by "group
leaders" who give advice but do not decide cases. In order to aid officials in adjudicating claims by aliens from more than 100 countries,
the Bundesamt has developed a documentation center in Zirndorf that
maintains information and court decisions on a country-by-country
basis. The UNHCR has a representative at the Bundesamt who has
access to all files and can observe the hearings. 80
Quite unlike immigration authorities in the United States, the
Bundesamt does not automatically forward each claim to the Foreign
Ministry for an advisory opinion. According to a high level official
at the Bundesamt, the agency occasionally requests background information and facts from the Foreign Ministry, but the Ministry's opinions regarding political persecution are neither sought nor considered
binding. The official stressed that the Foreign Ministry serves as only
one source of information; Bundesamt officers also consult outside
experts, academics, newspapers, Amnesty International reports, and
other relevant sources.
Officials at the Bundesamt emphatically state that politics play no
role in their decisions and the immigration and foreign policies of the
government are not considered. But lawyers who represent asylum applicants are skeptical of the Bundesamt's claim of total independence.
First, they note that the agency's officials are appointed by the Interior Ministry. Although they concede that the Ministry is unlikely
to intervene in particular cases, they argue that civil servants, hoping
to advance in their careers, can hardly ignore the Ministry's political
stance. Second, they assert that significantly different recognition rates
for applicants from Eastern European countries as compared with those
from Western European or Asian countries such as Turkey,
Afghanistan, or Pakistan reflect political bias.
TABLE 4
WEST GERMAN RECOGNITION RATES FOR ASYLUM
APPLICANTS, BY CONTINENT

Recognized
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Asia

80.

AsylVfG art. 12, sec. 5.

3,154
1,168
6,220

Not Recognized
1980
2,938
43,140
22,292

% Recognized
51.8
2.6
21.8
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TABLE 4 (continued)
Recognized
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Asia

Not Recognized
1981

4,393
190
2,409

o/o Recognized

5,579
31,703
27,494

44.1
0.6
8.1

4,078
16,632
22,150

40.8
2.3
3.8

1982
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Asia

2,805
400
871

Government officials assert that these differences in recognition rates
indicate not bias, but simply the relative merits of the claims filed.
They state that most applicants from countries such as Turkey are
"economic refugees" seeking a better standard of living in Germany,
not fleeing political persecution. Federal authorities concede that the
high rate of denials may make it appear that claims from certain countries have been prejudged, but they maintain that each claim is decided on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, they explain the high
recognition rate for Eastern Europeans as due to the fact that these
countries punish illegal exit of citizens. Thus, the mere fact of leaving
may make such aliens refugees under German law. Finally, they point
to the low reversal rate of Bundesamt decisions by the administrative
courts (probably under five percent). 81 The administrative court decisions seem to support the federal agency's assertion that few aliens
who qualify as refugees are denied the status; 82 but this does not resolve
the question of disparate treatment. Since administrative courts rarely
review decisions to grant asylum status, 83 it is possible that persons
from certain countries (e.g., Eastern European nations) are afforded
more lenient treatment than applicants from countries such as Turkey,
Pakistan, or Ghana.
In sum, the centralized administrative structure of the German system
differs dramatically from the decentralized American process. In Germany, all asylum claims go to a single institution whose only task is
to adjudicate such claims; and adjudicators in the agency are able to
develop experience in asylum law and particular countries. This expertise, in turn, permits the adjudicators to be far less reliant upon advice
81. See Antwort der Bundesregierung, supra note 58, at 4.
82. Arguably, the low reversal rate in the administrative courts could simply indicate that
the courts have the same bias as the agency. Yet, conversations with approximately a dozen
administrative judgi:s lead me to believe that the judges start with no such bias.
83. Occasionally, the federal government will appeal the granting of asylum by the Bundesamt
or by an administrative court. The federal officer charged with representing the federal govern~
ment's interests is the Bundesbeauftragter.
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from the Foreign Ministry. Whether or not political considerations influence decision making is a matter of dispute, as it is in the United
States.
b. The courts- As previously mentioned, the West German Constitution guarantees judicial review of administrative decisions. Until
1980, all appeals from the Bundesamt were heard by a trial-level administrative court in Anspach. When the large increase in asylum claims
in the late 1970's inundated this court, the law was changed to make
denials of asylum claims reviewable in the administrative court of the
state in which the applicant resides. The rise in applications and the
decentralization of review brought administrative judges thousands of
cases with which they had no prior experience. In response, judicial
training programs in asylum law were conducted in which academics
and UNHCR personnel, among others, participated.
German administrative judges are members of the judicial branch
and view themselves as wholly independent from, and a check upon,
administrative authorities. They thus are more analogous to United
States federal judges than to immigration judges who are employees
of the Department of Justice and whose decisions are reviewable by
the BIA and the Attorney General. Yet the German administrative
judges play a role in asylum cases quite different from that assumed
by American federal judges. The trial-level administrative court, which
usually sits with five members (three professional and two lay judges),
is charged with making an independent, de novo, investigation of the
case before it. Although the applicant has some burden of bringing
forward facts upon which an inference could be based to support his
claim, there is no formal "burden of proof." The court must determine the facts for itself and reach its own conclusions about the validity
of the claim. 84
This role for the court presents obvious difficulties in asylum cases.
Since independent investigations of conditions in the home country are
virtually impossible, the judges must rely on information provided by
a variety of sources: newspapers, testimony of experts, and Amnesty
International reports. The file may often include comments from the
Foreign Ministry (which may also have been given to the Bundesamt),
but several administrative judges stated that they tend to give little weight
to such information, recognizing the demands that diplomacy places
on the Foreign Ministry not to offend certain countries. To improve
the information available for judges, courts may collect reports, articles,
and decisions of other courts. In Wiesbaden, the administrative court
has established a documentation center which methodically maintains
84. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] para. 86, 1960 BGBI I 11; as amended 1982 BGBJ
I 1834 (W. Ger.).
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records and information on a country-by-country basis. The center
subscribes to numerous newspapers and journals and occasionally
publishes papers on conditions in particular countries. Judges and
lawyers are given access to the materials.
Judges may also be assigned cases involving only a few countries
or one area of the world. This specialization permits judges to develop
expertise and to ask specific questions about political parties, events,
and people. Such knowledge helps the judges evaluate the credibility
of the applicant's testimony.
Most of the asylum applicants appearing before the administrative
courts have lawyers. 85 The role of- lawyers in the court proceedings,
however, is less important than the corresponding role played by
American lawyers. Given the duty of the court to establish the facts
independently, the hearing is largely taken up with questions directed
to the applicant by the five judges on the court. The role of lawyers
is generally restricted to asking questions or making a final statement
when the judges have completed their inquiries. 86
The Bundesamt is entitled to send a lawyer to defend the agency's
denial of the claim, but rarely does so. The agency has twenty lawyers
to monitor 60,000 pending cases. Usually the agency participates only
by way of a letter which states that it has nothing to add to its earlier
written decision.
Not surprisingly, there are informal methods of resolving cases. For
example, some judges reported that they may "negotiate" a settlement
with the alien whereby the local authorities will not enforce the expulsion order for a short period of time if the alien agrees not to appeal
the denial of the asylum claim. This permits the alien to accomplish
her purpose in coming to Germany while saving the courts further proceedings. Another informal device is for the judges to agree not to
decide a particularly difficult case. Since the appeal usually has a suspensive effect on expulsion by the local authorities, the alien remains in
the country. After two years the alien may get permission to work
and may ultimately be granted a residence card. These kinds of informal dispositions appear to be rare, but they do indicate a certain flexibility in the system.
85. The lawyers are usually paid by their clients or other organizations, although it is possible to ask the court to pay the lawyer's fee. In such cases, the court examining the case makes
a preliminary determination as to the alien's probability of success. Where the court decides
that success is likely, the state will pay the lawyer whether or not the alien ultimately prevails.
One judge estimated that fee requests are made in five to ten percent of the cases, but almost
none are granted.
86. Judges tended to divide the lawyers into different categories. Some are viewed as zealous
advocates who firmly believe in the merits of the client's claims and take an active role in the
proceedings. Others are seen as simply interested in a high volume of cases. The papers filed
by this group are often conclusory and repeat claims made in other cases.
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On the whole it appears that West Germany has developed an experienced corps of administrative judges in a relatively short period
of time. Although many of these administrative judges are young and
possibly more liberal than judges on the appeals court, the low rate
of reversals of Bundesamt decisions indicates that they do not freely
grant asylum claims. Finally, whether or not the Bundesamt is free
from political pressure, it appears that the administrative judges are
at least as independent as United States federal district judges.
2. Recent changes to expedite the adjudication of claims- Until
1978, asylum claims were generally treated like other cases under German administrative law: an alien could file an action in a state administrative court challenging an agency denial of his claim. The filing
of an asylum case had a suspensive effect on the deportation of the
alien. If the trial-level court denied his claim, the alien could appeal
to the state appellate administrative court, and from there to the Federal
Administrative Supreme Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). Additionally, the alien could file a collateral action in the Federal Supreme
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungericht) alleging deprivation of
a constitutional right. 87
The flood of new applications in the 1970' s seriously overburdened
the Bundesamt and the administrative courts. As in the United States,
the lengthy adjudication process probably stimulated the filing of additional claims. It also dramatically increased the burden on state governments, which were charged with maintaining the applicants pending
final determination of the claims.
After minor changes in procedure in 1978 and 1980, 88 the adjudication process was substantially modified by the 1982 Asylum Procedure
Act. The new law permits the local authorities to disregard applications from aliens who have been granted refugee status by another
country or are traveling under a passport issued by a country other
than their country of origin. 89 All other applications must be forwarded
to the federal agency. The Bundesamt is authorized to grant the claim
or find that it is either "unfounded" or "obviously unfounded." If
87. GG art. 93, sec. 4(a). The complaint has no suspensive effect, and the chances that the
Court will hear the case are minimal. In fact, complainants have been fined by the Court in
asylum cases for filing clearly unfounded claims. See NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW],
35/1981, at 1986.
88. In 1978, a federal statute attempted to speed up the adjudication time by (1) abolishing
an appeal within the federal agency, and (2) excluding appeals from the first-level administrative
court where the decision was unanimous. Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Asylverfahrens, 1978
BOB! I 1108 (W. Ger.). Further changes were made in 1980, including (1) authorizing decisions
by a single official at the Bundesamt (rather than a panel of three officials), and (2) combining
the alien's asylum and deportation case in the administrative court (which had the effect of denying an appeal in a deportation case where the court decision was unanimous). Zweites Gesetz
zur Beschleunigung des Asylverfahrens, 1980 BOB! I 1437 (W. Ger.).
89. Asy!VfG art. 7, sec. 3.
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the claim is determined to be "obviously unfounded," the local
authorities are permitted to deport the alien immediately. 90 The alien,
however, has the right to apply to an administrative court for a
preliminary injunction to prevent the deportation pending review of
the agency decision. Such application must be made within seven days
of receiving the deportation order. 91 The alien may also file an action
in the administrative court challenging the decision on the merits, but
the action does not have a suspensive effect on the deportation. 92 As
to those claims denied as "unfounded," the alien's action in the administrative court has a suspensive effect.
The new law severely limits appeals beyond the trial-level court. The
lower administrative court may either reverse the Bundesamt' s denial
or find that the claim is "obviously unfounded" or "unfounded." If
the court determines that the claim is "obviously unfounded," there
is no further appeal. 93 If the claim is deemed to be "unfounded," the
administrative court may authorize an appeal only if the case raises
an important issue of law or differs from higher court decisions. 94 For
appeals that are determined to be "unfounded" and for which the court
does not permit an appeal, the alien may file a special petition before
the appellate court asking that the appeal be permitted. 95 The law also
permits a single trial judge to hear the case, but generally the courts
have maintained the five-person panel. 96
No definitive data have been published on the operation of the new
system. A high-level official at the Bundesamt estimates that, since
the enactment of the new law, about twenty percent of the claims it
has denied have been deemed "obviously unfounded." He further
estimated that this will rise to about thirty-three and maybe as high
as forty percent. Figures for the administrative court are not yet
available, but individual judges estimate that only about two to five
percent of the Bundesamt's denials are reversed. They further estimate
90. AsylVfG art. 11, sec. I.
91. VwGO para. 80, sec. 5, 1960 BGBI I 17, as amended 1982 BGBI I 1834 (W. Ger.).
92. AsylVfG art. 11, sec. 2; id. art. 10, sec. 3. It is an open question whether these statutory
changes violate the constitutionally secured rights of asylum and judicial review of agency decisions. See P. BAUMUELLER, supra note 69, at 320; Beus, "Vorlaeujiger" Rechtsschutz bei offensichtlich unbegruendetem Asy/antrag, ZAR, 4/1982, at 191; Huber, Die Entwicklung des
Auslaender-und Arbeitserlaubnisrechts im Jahre 1981, NJW, 35/1982, at 1919. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Supreme Court) has upheld the constitutionality of the
provisions, Decree from Dec. 6, 1982, DVB!, 4/1983, at 719. But its decision is not definitive,
since only the Constitutional Supreme Court can decide constitutional questions with full binding effect.
93. Asy!VfG art. 32, sec. 6.
94. AsylVfG art. 32, sec. 2.
95. Asy!VfG art. 32, sec. 4.
96. The Constitutional Supreme Court has refused to hear a case challenging this provision
as violative of art. 19 of the German Constitution. Beschluss vom. 22 Sept. 1983, NJW, 1984,
at 559.
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that approximately one third of the cases rejected by the administrative
courts are deemed "obviously unfounded" (and thus are not appealable), half are "unfound~d without appeal," and the remainder
are "unfounded with appeal." It seems clear that, although the new
law still maintains a number of avenues for appeal, a significant percentage of asylum claims are not likely to be reviewed beyond the
Bundesamt, and a substantial majority will not be appealed beyond
. the trial-level administrative court.
.

D.

,

The Result of the Changes ·

The combined impact of the statutory and policy changes on the
number of asylum applications filed is apparent, as Table Three indicated. It is not clear, however, how much each element of the government's response contributed to the decline. The changes in the administrative and judicial procedures no doubt have expedited adjudication of the claims and have removed a significant burden on the two
upper levels of administrative appeals courts. But West German officials seem to believe that a streamlined process has not been the
primary factor in decreased asylum applications. It is far more likely
that the visa requirements, the removal of authorization to work and
receive benefits during the pendency of the claim, and the institution
of the communal housing facilities have been largely responsible for
the decrease. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the number
of claims filed began to drop in 1980 - two years before the major
procedural changes were enacted. Whatever the reasons for the decrease,
the fact of the substantial reduction in claims filed makes additional
reform unlikely in the near future. 97
This apparent success, however, is not viewed with equanimity by
all. The government maintains that "the sole objective of the measures
taken ... [is] to remove the incentives for those foreigners who are
not politically persecuted to enter the Federal Republic of Germany
. illegally for economic reasons by abusing the right of asylum. " 98 But
some know~edgeable observers of the asylum process believe that the
new policies have gone beyond the government's stated goal. They see
the new policies as part of a larger agenda to limit immigration of
bona fide refugees and- other aliens. Further, they note with alarm a
97. The government recognizes, of course, that there are exogenous factors beyond its control that affect the flow of refugees. The declaration of martial law in Poland, the change of
government in Ethiopia, and the invasion of Afghanistan brought thousands of asylum seekers
to Germany. As long as the political situation in many countries remains volatile, West Germany
can never be certain that it has eliminated the possibility of massive asylum applicant flows in
the future.
98. FEDERAL MINISTRY COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPoRT, supra note 63, para. 3.3 (unnumbered
page 3).
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seeming drift toward xenophobia, 99 evidenced in part by growing tensions between the large Turkish population in West Germany and German citizens 100 and by government proposals to further limit immigration and induce Turks to return to their native land. 101 Although West
Germany has never considered itself a country of immigration, there
are now over four million aliens among a native population of fiftyseven million. 102 With a declining population, hard economic times and
the 1983 electoral victory of the Christian Democrats, it seems a certainty that Germany will continue to pursue restrictive policies towards
immigration and refugees. 103
Questions remain regarding the asylum process which this study cannot answer. These include the relative importance of the various policies
in reducing the number of applicants, whether bona fide refugees are
being deterred from applying in Germany, and whether the claims of
aliens who do apply are being adjudicated in an evenhanded fashion.
Furthermore, the reduction in the number of applicants for asylum
may tell us little about the overall flow of aliens into Germany. Just
as the ending of the guest worker program produced, in part, the increase in asylum claims, so too the tightening of the asylum system
99. See Brintzinger, Stimmenfang mit Auslaenderproblemen, ZAR, 2/1982, at 96; DER SPIEGEL,
27/1982, at 38; DER SPIEGEL, 18/1982, at 29; DER SPIEGEL, 50/1981, at 24.
100. The government points to low naturalization rates of long-term Turkish residents as
evidencing nonintegration of aliens into German society. This has second generation consequences
since, under German law (and quite unlike American law), children born to aliens in Germany
are not automatically German citizens. Reichs-und Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz art. 4, 1913, as
of Reichsgesetzblatt S. 1953 (Ger.).
,
101. Policies under study mix the stick with the carrot. Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmerman has proposed reducing the age limit for the entry of immigrant children from 16 to 6 and
cutting back on foreign student programs. A right-wing face of Germany, ECONOMIST, Aug.
27, 1983, at 27. As a carrot, the government is considering direct cash payments to Turks who
return to Turkey. The funds would come from the employee's contribution to unemployment
and social security programs. ZAR, 4/1982, at 166.
A large problem facing the German government is the EEC's 1963 Association Agreement
with Turkey, which appears to grant Turks free access to jobs in any EEC country beginning
in 1986. EEC-Turkey Association Agree.,:nent art. 12 (Sept. 12, 1963): Additional Protocol art.
36, signed at Brussels (Nov. 23, 1970); Decision of Association Council (Dec. 20, 1976). See
generally Fear that Turkish treaty with EEC will lead to huge influx, Stuttgarter Zeitung, Feb.
22, 1982, reprinted as translated in German Tribune, Mar. 7, 1982, at 4; Antwort der
Bundesregierung, supra note 58, at 9. The Kohl government has stated that it will seek an agreement with Turkey restricting migrant labor under the Association Agreement. ZAR, 4/1982,
at 166. See generally Turkey and the EEC: Wait and See, EcoNOMIST, Nov. 12, 1983, at 60.
102. In some areas, such as greater Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich and Berlin, as much as
200Jo of the population are aliens.
103. An official policy statement of the Kohl government states:
Germany is not a country of immigration. Thus, all necessary measures, acceptable
from a humanitarian standpoint, must be taken to prevent further immigration. The
recruitment [of foreign workers] ban must be maintained. Illegal entry and employment must be prevented. A stay for education and study must not, as a matter of
principle, lead to permanent residence . . . . The negotiations with Turkey regarding
a restriction of the Association Agreement must continue promptly.
ZAR, 4/1982, at 166 (translated from German).
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may simply shift aliens to other routes of entry - such as illegal entry. 104
It does seem clear, however, that changes in policies and procedures
can be effective in influencing aliens' choices about applying for asylum.
Ill.

FRANCE

France, in recent years, has experienced a leap in the number of
applications for asylum. Although the total number of claims is considerably smaller than the number filed in West Germany or the United
States, the increase has severely strained adjudicatory institutions and
has imposed unanticipated financial burdens. The government has
recognized that the present state of affairs cannot continue, but no
significant reform measures have yet been developed or implemented.
In short, while West Germany is several years ahead of the United
States in terms of adopting programs to deal with huge increases in
asylum applications, France is a year or two behind.
A.

The Problem

France admits refugees in two ways. Each year a predetermined
number of refugees is selected and processed overseas. This program
is similar to the system established in the United States by the Refugee
Act of 1980. In addition, France, like the United States, permits an
unlimited number of aliens at the border or inside the country to apply
for asylum.
The great majority of refugees selected through the overseas program are Indo-Chinese. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, France has
taken almost 75,000 South East Asians; in recent years the Indo-Chinese
program has brought in between 8,000 and 10,000 refugees annually.
France also reserves several hundred visas a month for refugees from
other countries. These are issued overseas by French consulates, and
usually are made available to Latin Americans or East Europeans.
France regulates the number of refugees it selects abroad, but it has
no such controls on the number of aliens who may apply for asylum
in France. In the last five years, the number of applications adjudicated
in France - not including South East Asia quota cases - has more
than tripled as table 5 indicates.

104. Or, it may deflect asylum seekers to other countries viewed as more hospitable example, France.

for
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TABLE 5 105
ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS IN FRANCE (EXCLUDING
SOUTH EAST ASIANS),

1977-1982

Year

Number

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

3,070
3,234
6,134
7,864
8,929
11,196

The countries contributing most to this rise are generally not the
same as those in West Germany. In France, the major groups (excluding
East Europeans and South East Asians) have been Sri Lankans, Zairians,
Angolans, Haitians, Ghanaians, Pakistanis, Indians, Chileans, and
Turks.
The causes of the rise in applications in France appear to be quite
similar to those in West Germany. First, asylum seekers in_France are
eligible for an array of privileges and benefits. Programs established
primarily for Indo-Chinese refugees - emergency aid upon arrival,
housing, clothing, welfare payments, permission to work, language training, and other services - are also made available to applicants from
other countries not selected through the overseas quota program. Thus,
an alien who has applied for asylum in France is entitled to a temporary residence card and permission to work. Applicants unable to
find work are entitled to unemployment benefits. They also are eligible for housing allowances, medical care, and other benefits subsidized
by the French government through private organizations.
These programs and policies make France a desirable country of resettlement for aliens fleeing persecution. Yet they also have proven attractive to aliens with marginal or frivolous claims whose primary
motivations in leaving their home countries are economic. French
authorities maintain that these aliens have resorted to the asylum process in increasing numbers following France's "suspension" of immigration a decade ago. Prior to that time, relatively open immigration policies had permitted large numbers of aliens seeking jobs to enter

105. These are adjudications by the Office fran9aise de protection des refugies et apatrides
(OFPRA), not claims filed. Since OFPRA decides most claims within a year of filing, these
numbers properly identify the trend in filings even if they may be somewhat smaller than actual
number of claims filed. In excluding South East Asians, the Table may slightly underestimate
the total number of asylum applicants, since not all South East Asian applicants enter under
the overseas refugee program.
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and reside in France. 106 The closing of lawful immigration for laborers
in July 1974, 101 however, has led some aliens to apply for asylum to
receive authorization to work and stay in France pending adjudication
of their claims. Because of a lengthy adjudication process, such aliens
can count on being able to work and receive welfare payments for
several years. Indeed, as France makes no serious effort to deport aliens
whose claims are eventually denied, a claim for asylum, no matter what
its merit, effectively leads to permanent residence.
The increase in claims filed may also be due, in part, to the restrictive policies recently adopted by West Germany. France today is clearly
a more hospitable country to asylum seekers. Therefore, it is not surprising that the decline of Turks applying for asylum in Germany is
occurring at the same time that French officials are reporting an increase in the number of Turkish applications.

B.

The Procedures

1. The legal framework- The Preamble to the 1946 French Constitution, which is incorporated by reference into the Constitution of
the Fifth Republic (1958), 108 provides: "Tout homme persecute en raison
de son action en faveur de la liberte a droit d'asile dans /es territoires
de la Republique. " 109 Although this provision is apparently not deemed
to have legal effect (as does the asylum article of the German Constitution), it clearly reflects the liberal policy France has traditionally
adopted toward asylum seekers.
The French asylum adjudication procedure has remained largely unchanged since its establishment by statute in 1952 and government decree
in 1953. 110 As in Germany, a central federal agency is charged with
the initial determination of claims. The Office franrais de proteciion
des refugies et apatrides (OFPRA) is technically part of the Ministry
of Foreign Relations; but it, like the German Bundesamt, is endowed
with independent decision-making authority. OFPRA is run by a Director appointed by the Minister of Foreign Relations. Its operations are
overseen by an interministerial council comprised of representatives from

106. Thomas, The status of immigrant workers in France, in IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE:
THEIR LEGAL STATUS 41-42 (E. Thomas ed. 1982). See generally, D. AsHFORD, POLICY AND POLITICS
IN FRANCE 41-81 (1982); G. FREEMAN, IMMIGRANT LABOR AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES: THE FRENCH AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1945-1975, at 68-98 (1979).
107. See Thomas, supra note 106, at 41-42.
108. CONST. preamble (France).
109. CONST. preamble (France 1946) ("Anyone persecuted because of his activities in the
cause of freedom has the right of asylum within the territories of the Republic").
110. Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.); Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953
J .0.), as amended.
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the Ministries of Foreign Relations, Interior, Social Affairs, Justice,
Economy and Finance, and Labor. 111
An alien seeking asylum in France is first directed to a local prefecture
where she. receives a card authorizing temporary residence in France
(authorisation provisoire de sejour). 112 The alien is then referred to
OFPRA, where a formal request for recognition is submitted. OFPRA
gives the applicant documentation which makes the alien eligible for
social benefits and authorizes employment. If able to find a job, she
presents the labor contract to the local Direction de Department de
Travail and is issued a temporary work permit. The work authorization is valid for an initial period of six months and is renewable. If
unable to find work, the applicant registers with the Agence National
Pour L 'emploi, a national hiring hall. 113
If OFPRA grants the alien refugee status, she is given a carte de
refugie. She must then return to the prefecture for a carte de sejour
which authorizes permanent residence in France. 114 If OFPRA denies
the claim, the alien has one month to appeal to the Commission des
recours des refugies. She may also appeal if OFPRA has not rendered
a decision within four months after the filing of the application. In
such cases, the claim is deemed to have been "implicitly denied." 11 '
The membership of the Commission des recours makes it extraordinary in comparison to asylum adjudication systems in the United
States and Germany. It is composed of three persons: a member of
the Conseil d'Etat, a representative from one of the ministries on
OFPRA's council (usually the Labor Ministry), and a representative
from the UNHCR's office in France. The UNHCR representative is
a full voting member in the Commission. 116
The filing of an appeal before the Commission has a suspensive effect
on deportation of the alien. 111 The Director of OFPRA is given notice
that an appeal has been filed, and OFPRA. has one month to comment on the case. 118 However, OFPRA may also decide to reverse its
initial denial of asylum and grant recognition. In such cases, of course,
the appeal is withdrawn. The judicial role of the Commission appears
closer to that of an American appellate court (giving deference to the
administrative agency and placing the burden of proof on the alien)
than to a German administrative court (which is charged with an independent duty to investigate and determine the facts).
Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.), art. 3.
Office National d'lmmigration, Le Point sur /es Refugies et /es Apatrides, 29
ACTUALITES-MIGRATJONS [A-M] 4 (1983).
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J.O.), title III, ch. II, art. 20.
116. Law No. 52-893, July 25, 1952 (1952 J.0.), art. 5.
117. Id. art. 5(b).
118. Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J.0.), title III, ch. II, art. 21.
111.
112.
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Most cases end with the decision of the Commission des recours.
The alien may file an appeal, however, before the Conseil d'Etat, which,
among other things, serves as the administrative supreme court. The
appeal to the Conseil d'Etat is limited strictly to legal issues 119 and
has no suspensive effect. 120 The proceeding is written and the alien
must be represented by an attorney. 121

2.
a.

The process in actionBefore OFPRA- The rise in the number of asylum claims has

seriously overburdened OFPRA. Including applications from the IndoChinese selected under the overseas program, OFPRA receives about
20,000 to 25,000 new cases a year. No real adjudication of the South
East Asian claims occurs; OFPRA simply accepts the overseas determination that the alien is a refugee. 122 Surprisingly, however, a senior
OFPRA official reported that hearings involving these aliens are often
quite complex and time-consuming. This is because the primary criterion
used by the French government to select the Indo-Chinese is family
reunification. It is thus quite important to establish accurately the identity and family members of the refugees to prevent subsequent abuse
of the system.
For the remaining applicants, the crucial question is whether the alien
comes within the definition of "refugee." OFPRA's investigation and
documentation of such claims seem far less thorough than that done
in Germany. The primary basis for the decision is an interview of the
applicant; OFPRA has twenty interviewers who, together, conduct approximately 20,000 interviews a year. No documentation center on the
German scale exists, and lawyers for the applicants are rarely present.
Occasionally, additional information is supplied from the Interior or
Foreign Ministries or French embassies. Nonetheless, as an official in
another Ministry stated, the OFPRA dossiers are rather thin.
OFPRA's difficulty in obtaining sufficient information for the adjudication of claims has been exacerbated as the countries of origin
119. 1 A. DE LAUBADf:RE, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF para. 832 (4th ed.
1967).
120. Ordinance No. 45-1708, July 31, 1945 (1945 J.O.), § IV, art. 48.
121. Decree No. 53-934, September 30, 1953 (1953 J.O.), art. 11.
122. Several government officials commented that many of the recent South East Asian entrants do not come within the definition of "refugee" in the Geneva Convention because their
motivations for leaving appear to be primarily economic. OFPRA, however, considers the overseas
selection as determinative, and justifies the granting of refugee status on humanitarian grounds
and in recognition of France's special concern for such persons given its earlier role in South
East Asia.
A similiar development has been noticed in the American refugee process. Refugees selected
overseas seem to be judged by a lower standard than aliens who apply for asylum here. See
SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 169-71 (1981). For an argument in support of the current
practice, see Martin, supra note 1, at 101-04.
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of the applicants have shifted. In the years just after World War II,
ninety percent of the asylum seekers were Europeans; the French
authorities had good information regarding the political conditions in
the claimants' home countries. Today, with applicants from over eighty
countries (eighty percent of whom are non-Europeans), OFPRA is far
less able to gather reliable information about individuals and political
events. These developments are further complicated by the market in
false documents and identities. OFPRA is aware of individuals who
have applied for asylum under several names, claiming a different nationality and presenting different sets of false documents each time.
b. The four month rule ("refus implicite")- As mentioned above,
French law directs OFPRA to reach a decision on each application
within four months. Failure to do so constitutes a "refus implicite,"
from which the alien may appeal immediately to the Commission des
recours. 123 Although the "four month rule" is generally hailed in international circles as a model for other countries, it actually plays a
minor role in the adjudication process and is used primarily in circumstances that have nothing to do with untoward delay.
OFPRA apparently decides the cases of aliens who appear to be true
refugees in fairly short order (four to five months). For aliens from
countries with low recognition rates, however, the process averages about
one year. Aliens from these countries could invoke the four month
rule, but rarely do; either they are not aware of the rule or have no
interest in invoking it since their appeals are likely to be rejected. They,
of course, would prefer that the process take as long as possible, during
which time they are authorized to work and receive social benefits.
Accordingly, invocation of the "four month rule" by the alien is
quite exceptional. More often it appears to be a device used by the
French government to avoid making a decision with unpleasant political
ramifications. For example, if an opposition leader in a country friendly
to France applies for political asylum, recognition of the claim could
be an embarrassment to the government's conduct of foreign policy.
One way to avoid the problem is for OFPRA to ''decide not to decide''
the claim. After four months, the alien may take his claim to the Commission des recours. The Commission, particularly because of the
presence of the UNHCR representative, has the appearance of being
a truly independent body, not subject to control by the government.
Under these circumstances, asylum may be granted; but recognition
is not as likely to be viewed as an act of the French government.
c. Political interference in the asylum process- The preceding
discussion raises the question of how independent OFPRA is from
government political pressure and foreign relation interests. There seems
123.

Decree No. 53-377, May 2, 1953 (1953 J .0.), title I, art. 4.
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to be general agreement among government officials, academics, and
private lawyers that, for a substantial majority of the cases, OFPRA
reaches its decision on the merits with no interference from other government ministries.
But, as was obvious from a number of comments by government
and OFPRA officials, the agency does not exist in a political vacuum.
The Director is appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; OFPRA
is overseen by a council composed of representatives from a number
of ministries; and all recognize that asylum decisions may have serious
political implications both domestically and abroad. Indeed, several
high-ranking government officials in the ministries candidly stated that
they will occasionally call OFPRA to check on the progress of a case
- although they maintained that their intervention is limited to seeking expedition or delay in the processing of the claim and not for the
purpose of influencing the decision on the merits. Furthermore, to some
extent changes in recognition rates for certain countries have followed
political shifts. For example, since the Mitterand government took
power, a substantially higher percentage of Haitian claimants (almost
sixty percent in 1981, and almost ninety percent in 1982) are being
granted refugee status by OFPRA. ·
In addition to setting general policies, the government theoretically
may intervene in the asylum process through advice given by the Foreign
Ministry and the embassies on particular cases. The French Foreign
Ministry, however, appears to play a far less important role than does
the State Department in American asylum determinations. There exists
no· procedure by which the Foreign Ministry is regularly requested to
state its views on cases.
d. The Commission des recours- Like OFPRA, the Commission
des recours has been hit hard by the rapid rise in asylum applications.
Of course, if OFPRA granted most claims, it would not affect the
work of the Commission. But a large portion of the claims now being
filed are deemed by OFPRA to be frivolous or economically based; 124
and approximately seventy percent of the claims denied by OFPRA
· are appealed. Thus the Commission's work load has been steadily ris-

124.

The number and percentage of claims denied by OFPRA have risen in recent years.

Year

Claims Denied

Percent Denied
(not including South East
Asians)

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

894
2,514
2,914
4,181
5,240

27.6
40.9
37.0
46.8
46.8
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ing, and appeals now may take over a year to be decided. In 1982,
the Commission decided 3,269 cases, while 4,609 were filed.
The Commission, in 1982, reversed the decision of OFPRA in approximately twelve percent of the appeals filed. This is a substantially
higher proportion than the percentage of Bundesamt decisions reversed
by the German administrative courts, even though OFPRA grants
asylum with much greater frequency than does the Bundesamt. The
reversal rate does not appear to be a product of strict or incorrect
legal interpretation by OFPRA. Rather, the reversal rate seems to be
a product of the inability of OFPRA to conduct a thorough investigation of the claim prior to rendering its decision. 125 Thus, files are often
incomplete and missing significant information that is made available
for the first time to the Commission. Two other factors are important. First, while almost no applicants have lawyers present during the
OFPRA interview, lawyers often help in preparing the appeal and
sometimes represent applicants before the Commission. Furthermore,
the applicant receives a written decision from OFPRA indicating the
reasons for the denial. This affords the alien an opportunity to develop
further information to support the claim.
As noted above, OFPRA is sent a copy of the appeal as soon as
it is filed. The ability of the alien to make a far better case before
the Commission than he did before OFPRA is indicated by the practice of OFPRA reversing its own denial of the claim after considering
the appellate file. In 1982, OFPRA reversed itself in approximately
thirteen percent of the cases appealed to the Commission.
At the beginning of a Commission hearing, a rapporteur reads a
summary of the file and usually recommends a disposition of the case.
His report is based primarily on the case file, although occasionally
he may undertake independent research; the rapporteur does not contact the applicant. The three judges then ask the alien questions, seeking additional information and exploring any inconsistencies in the
alien's statements before OFPRA and the Commission. It appears that
the Commission's evaluation' of the alien's credibility is of critical
importance. 126 The Commission does not provide interpreters, and the
proceedings are neither recorded nor transcribed. In observing the proceedings, one is struck by the clear lack of understanding on the part
of some aliens as to what is being asked. The Commission usually issues
a written decision, which is prepared by the rapporteur, within a month
or two of the hearing.
125. This situation is analogous to the high reversal rates by American administrative law
judges of agency determinations denying applicants social security disability benefits. See generally
Bloch, Representation and Advocacy at Non-Adversary Hearings: The Need for Non-Adversary
Representatives at Social Security Disability Hearings, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 349, 351-52 (1981).
126. Heilbronner, La Commission de Recours des Refugies, 30 CoNsEIL o'ETAT: ETUDES ET
DOCUMENTS Ill (1978-79).
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e. Role of the UNHCR- The UNHCR plays a far more important role in the French asylum system than it does in the American
or German systems. It has three points of access: it observes OFPRA's
application of the Geneva Convention; it sits on the OFPRA council;
and it serves on the Commission des recours. The presence of the international organization is significant in several respects. First, it improves decision making to the extent it provides information on conditions in an alien's home country not otherwise easily available to OFPRA
or the French government. Second, because of its monitoring of other
nations, it can also report on interpretations of the Convention reached
by other countries. Third, the role of the UNHCR on the Commission
des recours helps give a nonpolitical, independent appearance to the
appellate process. Finally, the UNHCR presence assists the French
government in justifying and legitimating the system's decisions for
domestic and international audiences. Charges that the system is either
too strict or too lenient, or infected by political concerns, can be
answered by pointing to the concurrence of the UNHCR.
The UNHCR does not use its role to serve as an advocate for asylum
applicants. It recognizes that adherence to the Convention's definition
of "refugee" is in the long-term interest of all present and future political
refugees; both the UNHCR's credibility and the willingness of France
to accept refugees would be harmed by an attitude that anyone who
claims political asylum should receive it. The purpose of the UNHCR,
one of its officials stated, is not to "manufacture refugees." Rather
it plays a cautious role, intervening only when convinced that recognition should be granted. Thus, during the proceedings of the Commission des recours, the UNHCR representative often questions the aliens
closely, probing their stories for facts or contradictions. Because of
their evenhandedness, UNHCR representatives are not ignored by the
government members on the Commission. It is significant that, according to one member, the Commission reaches a unanimous decision in
about ninety percent of the cases it hears.
f. The Conseil d'Etat- An alien may, under certain circumstances,
appeal a decision of the Commission des recours to the Conseil d' Etat.
Until 1979, no aliens had used this procedure to appeal a Commission
decision. Since then, however, the number of such appeals has exploded:
TABLE 6
CASES FnED AT THE CoNsEn D'ETAT,

Year
1979
1980
1981
1982

Number
10
27
71
97

1979-82
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The Conseil d'Etat will review the proceedings below only for errors
of law or procedure. 121 Its decisions can have significant consequences.
For example, in January 1981, the Consei/ d'Etat fundamentally altered
a well-established rule of law that OFPRA and the Commission des
recours had ·been applying for twenty-five years. It held that an alien
who came within the Geneva Convention's definition of "refugee"
should not be denied asylum in France on the ground that he had stayed
for some time in a country of first asylum ("pays d'acceuil") prior
to arriving in France. 128
The rise in the number of cases appealed to the Conseil d'Etat poses
serious problems for French attempts to speed up the adjudication process. Additional levels of appeal, as the German and American
experiences make clear, are likely to be exploited.
g. The return of aliens denied asylum- In West Germany, the
responsibility for the return of applicants denied asylum rests with the
states. State officials have no hard data on the numbers of aliens who
return to their countries of origin after exhausting judicial remedies.
Some claim that most aliens leave because of the difficulty of finding
work without proper documentation. And occasionally, a state will
pay the expense of sending an alien and his family home. Nonetheless,
it appears that a significant percentage either leave Germany for another
country (other than their country of origin) or go underground in
Germany.
In France, the government currently makes no attempt to send home
any aliens denied asylum. Unsuccessful applicants may be sent a letter
by the government informing them that they have a certain number
of months to leave, but no effort is made to locate or deport the aliens.
French officials generally justify this situation on the ground that an
alien denied asylum has probably been residing in France for several
years by the time the process ends and thus has probably developed
significant ties with the French economy and society. Furthermore, the
administrative costs may be substantial in finding the alien and paying
his airfare home. 129 Yet it is difficult to believe that the French will
127. 1 A. DE LAUBADERE, supra note 119, at 489-505.
128. Judgment of January 16, 1981, Conseil d'Etat, Recuil des decisions du Conseil d'Etat
20 (case of Boubacar Conte). Conte had left Guinea in 1971, stayed in Senegal for four years,
and then had journeyed to France.
129. M. Gilles Rosset, Secretary-General of OFPRA, has recently commented on this problem:
La re/outer ou? Sur le pays d'origine? En general, c'est tres lointain. La mettre dons
un avion? Cela coute tres cher. C'est complique juridiquement. ·Et moralement? Et
puis, on court le risque qu'elle soit vraiment menacee. Meme si elle ne repond pas au
statut de refugie, if s'agit peut-etre quand meme d'un refugie. On peut s'etre trompe.
If ne semble pas que les candidats au statut de refugie a qui la protection de l'Office
a ete refusee, aient ete expulses OU meme refou/es.
(Return him? Where? To his home country? In general, that's very distant. Put him
on a plane? This is very expensive. It is legally complicated. And morally? Then we
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be able to maintain this de facto policy of nonreturn. Quite simply,
it effectively grants permanent residence to any alien who arrives in
France and asks for asylum.
h. Benefits for asylum applicants- As noted above, France provides substantial financial and resettlement assistance to asylum
applicants. 130 These programs began after World War II and expanded
to help welcome refugees from South East Asia. Today the programs
remain generally available to all asylum applicants, even though a rising number of non-South East Asian applicants are not being granted
asylum. The programs are generally provided by private voluntary agencies funded by the government. They provide emergency lodging,
clothing, and other aid as well as an initial two or three month stipend
of about 1200 francs per person. Longer range programs such as French
language and occupational training may also be available. 131 Applicants
are also entitled to free medical care 132 and unemployment benefits
if they are unable to find work. 133
The voluntary agencies providing these programs have begun to be
overtaxed by the increased number of asylum applicants. For example, temporary housing is now reportedly oversubscribed, and some
applicants are being sent to public shelters or go without lodging.
Given the increased cost of providing adequate programs, combined
with a depressed economy and the beginning of anti-alien agitation, 134
it seems clear that the government will come under increasing pressure
to reduce benefits.
C.

French Proposals for Change

The government is clearly aware that the asylum system is on the
verge of breaking down. Although the number of claims filed and pending is substantially below the levels that produced the dramatic German policy changes, OFPRA is seriously overworked. In addition, the
delays at the Commission des recours are viewed as unacceptable and
the· increasing cost of benefits to applicants is a potential political
run the risk that he really will be threatened. Even if he doesn't fit the status of refugees,
he could still be a refugee. We can be mistaken. It doesn't seem that people who have
applied for asylum but have been refused protection by the office have been expelled
or even returned.)
130. See generally LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: RefugiE EN FRANCE 10-11 (1982).
131. Office National d'lmmigration, Le Point Sur Agrement de Stages de Formation Professionnelle par l'Etat au Niveau National: Prise en Charge des Refugies Politiques, 39 A-M 14-15
(1983).
132. LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: COMMENT SE SOIGNER EN FRANCE ld-5d (1983).
133. LA CIMADE, GUIDE DU REFUGIE: TRAVAILLER EN FRANCE-AIDE Aux TRAVAILLEURS PRIVES
D'EMPLOI lb-6b-(1981).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
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liability. Small reforms have occurred; the staff at OFPRA has been
augmented, 135 and the Commission des recours has been divided into
several sections to help handle the growing backlog of claims. Recently,
OFPRA has decided to establish fifteen regional offices near border
crossing points. 136 The purpose of these suboffices is to identify more
quickly frivolous claims and to avoid the problem of applicants disappearing between their place of entry and OFPRA's central office outside Paris.
The government, however, has not yet generated a larger set of proposals to deal with the situation. The French are clearly unwilling to
adopt the German approach, particularly the communal housing
facilities for applicants. Other proposals have been suggested, such as
reducing benefit levels, expelling aliens denied asylum, or repealing the
suspensive effect of appeals to the Commission des recours. But these
are generally viewed as retreating from France's traditional welcoming
of refugees and thus are unpalatable to the Socialist government. One
official stated that France lacks, at the moment, the volonte politique
to change the system. Nonetheless, it seems reasonably clear that
something must, and will, change in France in a year or two if the
number of applications continues to rise at the current rate.
The asylum "crisis" must also be viewed in a broader context. Immigration in France has become a major social issue. In the past twenty
years, the alien population in France has more than doubled, and now
stands at more than three and one-half million (almost seven percent
of the total French population). 137 More importantly, the percentage
of aliens from Third World nations has increased most dramatically.
Finally, even with such measures as the 1974 suspension of immigration, the number of aliens in France continues to grow as family
members are permitted to join earlier immigrants and other aliens enter
illegally.
The political controversy surrounding immigration became apparent
in the 1970's when aliens began to be identified with social problems
135. Office National d'Immigration, Questions Ecrites Sur /es difficultes rencontrees par l'OFPRA, 39 A-M 13 (1983).

136. Le Gendre, Des Mesures Pour Sauvegarder Le Droit D'Asile: Vrais et Faux Refugies
Politiques, Le Monde Hebdomadaire, Feb. 9, 1984.
137. The largest groups of aliens in France are:
ALIENS IN FRANCE

Nationality

Number

Algerian
Portuguese
Morrocan
Italian
Spanish
Tunisian

795,920
764,860
431,120
333,740
321,440
189,400
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such as crime, deterioration in housing, and ghettoization. 138 Aliens'
roles in labor strikes and militant protests against living conditions further contributed to anti-alien sentiment. Even the French Communist
Party joined in some local anti-alien actions. 139 The Mitterand government, shortly after taking office, instituted a number of important
reforms, including a legalization program for long-term undocumented
workers and increased judicial involvement in the deportation process. 140
Nonetheless, a deteriorating French economy and alien participation
in strikes and acts of terrorism have continued to fuel animus against
aliens. 141 Recently, political candidates of the right have run on tough
anti-immigration platforms calling for the expulsion of resident aliens. 142
This backlash has, in turn, produced a countermovement against what
the left terms the racist underpinnings of the anti-alien fervor. 143 In
the fall of 1983, 70,000 persons marched in Paris in support of fair
treatment for aliens. 144
The vociferous debates in France over immigration and the treatment of aliens are likely to influence government policies regarding
asylum applicants. To the extent that the anti-alien forces gain political
power, government programs that appear to support persons without
bona fide claims will come under serious fire. The problem that lies
ahead for France is how to structure and implement policies that reduce
the number and burden of frivolous claims without betraying the nation's historical commitment to helping refugees.

138. See D. AsHFORD, supra note 107; M. Schain, The Third World in France (unpublished
paper prepared for 1983 Convention of the International Studies Assoc., Mexico City, Mexico,
April 5-9, 1983).
139. Id.
140. See generally Secretariat D'Etat Aux lmmigres, Office National D'Immigration, La
Nouvelle Politique de l'/mmigration et Le D_ispositif Legislatif Adopte en Octobre 1981, Nov.
30, 1981 (supplement to AcTUALIT~S-MIGRATIONS).
141. See Allier, Les principes n'ont pas sombre, LE NoUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Aug. 21, 1982,
at 19, 20; Enoch Chirac, EcoNoMIST, Aug. 6, 1983, at 36--37; Boucher, Droit d'asile, refugie,
terrorisme, Le Monde, Sept. 15, 1982, at 1, 7.
142. See A Whiff of Racism in France, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1983, at 59, 60; M. Le Pen:
contre /'integration de la communaute nord-africaine, Le Monde, Sept. 14, 1983, at 8, col. 5;
Claude Mauriac: l'incendie couve, Le Monde, Sept. 12, 1983, at 7, col. 5; Plenel, Le lit du
racisme: L 'extreme droite a fait de /'immigration sa cible. II serait dangereux de laisser le champ
libre a la logique du bouc emissaire, Le Monde, Sept. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
143. See Sole, Le Sursaut des antiracistes, Le Monde, Dec. 14, 1983 at 13, col. 3.
144. Beau & Schneidermann, Le succes et les consequences du rassemblement contre le racisme,
Le Monde, Dec. 6, 1983, at 12, col. l; Chalandon & Favereau, 70,000 Supporters pour le succes
d'une tongue marche, Liberation, Dec. 5, 1983, at 2, 3.
The government has recently announced that it would pay unemployed immigrants up to $3,750
to return to their home countries. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1984, at AS, col. 2.
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LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Comparison of Responses and Results

The three western democracies examined here have had similar experiences in recent years. -World events, improved transportation and
communication, generous asylum policies, high standards of living, and
limits on legal immigration have produced in each country a huge rise
in the number of asylum claims. The rapid increases have overwhelmed
existing adjudicatory institutions causing long delays which themselves
may well have stimulated more filings.
The responses of the three countries, which have varied considerably,
have been directed at two aims: expediting the adjudication of claims
and deterring the filing of new claims. Germany has moved vigorously
on both fronts. It has enacted measures that streamline the adjudication process by bringing more judges into the process and restricting
appeals. To deter the filing of claims, Germany has cut benefits,
restricted work authorization, required visas and instituted communal
housing arrangements. The results of these new policies have been
dramatic. France, so far, has hardly altered its adjudication process
and has done little to deter the filing of claims.
The United States, under the Reagan Administration, has focused
primarily on programs designed to deter additional asylum claims. 145
These measures have been part of a broader initiative to ''regain control of our borders." 146 In the summer of 1981, the INS instituted a
new policy of detaining aliens who arrive at the border without
documentation or a colorable right to enter. The government also sought
to stop the flow of Haitian boat people into Southern Florida. President Reagan issued an Executive Order' 47 authorizing the Coast Guard
to stop and return vessels believed to be transporting aliens to the United
States in violation of the immigration laws. By exchange of notes, the
government also entered into an agreement with Haiti that permits
145. The Carter Administration policy was largely ad hoc and incoherent. President Carter
initially welcomed the Mariel Cubans with "an open heart and open arms," N. Y. Times, May
6, 1980, at Al, col. 1, but the Justice Department subsequently sought to prosecute over 300
persons who transported the Cubans between Mariel and Florida. (The indictments were later
dismissed on the ground that the defendants' actions - which included openly presenting the
Cubans to immigration officials upon arrival in the United States - were not condemned by
the antismuggling provisions of the immigration laws, INA§ 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). United
States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (en bane)). Similarly, although the Administration made human rights a mainstay of its foreign policy, the INS initiated a program of mass
adjudication of Haitian asylum claims that seriously violated the due process rights of the applicants. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
146. See Joint Hearing, supra note 19, at 6 (statement of Attorney General Smith).
147. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
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American authorities to return ships to Haiti in order to enforce "appropriate Haitian laws." 148 Under this interdiction program, the United
States has stopped and returned to Haiti some 56 vessels carrying 1367
Haitians. Furthermore, the government adopted a regulation restricting opportunities for asylum applicants to work pending adjudication
of their claims. Under the new rule, an INS district director may grant
employment authorization only upon a determination that the asylum
claim is "non-frivolous."
Legal actions have stymied some of these deterrent measures. A
federal district court invalidated the detention policy; and a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the policy had been promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and applied
to Haitian applicants in a discriminatory manner. 149 Although the panel's
decision was recently overturned on other grounds by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en bane, 150 most of the Haitian detainees had been released
by order of the district court. In the southwest, two lawsuits have successfully challenged border patrol practices that persuaded Salvadorans
to leave the United States without filing asylum claims. 151 An action
brought by a Haitian refugee group in the United States challenging
the legality of the interdiction program was dismissed for lack of
standing 152 - although the government has never asserted a satisfactory moral or legal basis for the policy. 1 53
148. Agreement on Interdiction of Migrants, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S.
No. 10241.
149. Jean v. Nelson, 7ll F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part, rev'd in part, No.
82-5772, slip op. (I Ith Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane).
150. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane).
151. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537
F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
152. Haitian Refugee Center v. Stabile, No. 81-2428 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 17, 1981).
153. The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC), in a memorandum
to the Attorney General, asserted that both the agreement with Haiti and the immigration laws
provide legal authority for the interdiction program. Memorandum of Theodore B. Olson, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney General (August ll, 1981). It may
well be, as the OLC memorandum argues, that the President has inherent authority to enter
into executive agreements with a foreign nation to aid the enforcement of that country's laws.
But what does it say about the United States when it acts to enforce the laws of one of the
most repressive 'regimes in the Western Hemisphere? Furthermore, such a policy would seem
to undercut American criticisms of Eastern bloc nations who have similar laws restricting or
burdening the right to emigrate. The second claimed source of authority - American immigration laws - is quite doubtful. The OLC memorandum relies upon 8 U.S.C. § l 182(f) (1982),
which authorizes the President to suspend the entry of "any class of aliens" into the United
States where entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." It is hard to
see how this provision, which appears aimed at suspending the entry of otherwise admissible
aliens, authorizes the President to order the return of aliens stopped on the high seas. The Coast
Guard's action essentially permits the executive branch to avoid the procedures established by
the INA for determining the admissibility of an alien seeking entry.
The interdiction program is pernicious. It raises serious questions about American compliance
with the Geneva Convention, see Helton, supra note I, at 255-56, puts the United States in the
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The second goal - expedition of asylum adjudications - has been
the subject of several governmental initiatives. Legislation supported
by the Administration and passed twice by the Senate would assign
asylum claims to administrative law judges trained in refugee and international law, and would limit opportunities for judicial review. 154
The government has also taken part in a program to train members
of the bar to handle asylum cases 155 and has made action on asylum
claims a priority in INS district offices and at the State Department.
The deterrent and procedural measures adopted to date have not
been as successful as the German programs in stemming the influx of
asylum seekers. The number of applicants from Haiti - while never
a substantial portion of the total number of claimants - has dropped
to a trickle under the interdiction program. But increases from other
countries have kept the backlog of asylum claims steadily rising. Furthermore, although greater devotion of resources has begun to reduce the
backlogs in INS offices, over 40,000 claims (not including Cuban applications) remain to be adjudicated. Some 8,000 to 10,000 additional
applications are pending before immigration judges, and two cases are
being docketed for every one decided.
It is clear that additional proposals for change are necessary. Such
proposals must begin with identification and exploration of the fundamental goals of asylum policy.
B.

The Goals of American Asylum Policy

At the foundation of American asylum policy is our legal and moral
obligation not to return persons to countries in which there is a
reasonable likelihood that they will be persecuted. 156 It is important
to notice what this statement does not say. First, it does not require
the United States to grant asylum - effectively, permanent resident
status - to all aliens who come within the definition of "refugee";

role of enforcing the laws of a repressive dictator, and effectively nullifies congressionally mandated procedures for entry decisions. Its clear purpose is to stop asylum applicants before they
can reach the United States and receive the benefit of counsel in requesting a status guaranteed
by international convention and domestic law. See Taylor, U.S. Aides Defend Interdiction of
Haitians at Sea, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981. Because the program occurs on the high seas, there
is no way for courts to review the actions of the Coast Guard. See supra note 152. It is time
for Congress to put a stop to this dirty business.
154. See supra note 15.
155. Bruck, Springing the Haitians, American Lawyer, Sept. 1982, at 35.
156. The easiest way to achieve this goal would be to grant asylum to every alien who requests
it. But this is clearly an unacceptable policy because it would allow an unlimited number of
aliens to enter the country and render our ba~ic immigration restrictions meaningless. An asylumon-request policy would also threaten public support for existing, more limited, refugee programs if it were believed that asylum was being granted to aliens without bona fide claims.
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it simply prohibits the return of a bona fide refugee (non-refoulement).
This distinction is important because we may wish to limit the number
of aliens to whom we grant asylum in light of broader immigration
decisions regarding the number of aliens the nation is prepared to absorb each year. 157 Such a decision may not violate legal or moral norms
if we can find other nations that would welcome aliens eligible for
asylum. Second, the mere statement of the principle of non-return says
nothing about the obvious trade-off between the cost of adjudicating
claims and the degree of certainty of our decisions on the merits of
claims. Concern about the terrible consequences of wrongly denying
asylum may argue in favor of the fullest kind of investigation of claims.
But arriving at certainty about the likelihood of persecution could be
an extraordinarily expensive enterprise (assuming such certainty is attainable at all). The alternatives, however, are no less troublesome:
tolerating a lower level of certainty in decision making may either spark
the filing of marginal claims (if the standard of proof is too lenient)
or may run the risk of violating our obligation not to return refugees
(if the standard of proof is too strict). Taking these factors into consideration, a more refined statement of the basic American goal may
be to devise a set of policies and procedures that identify, with an
acceptable degree of certainty, an acceptable number of aliens who
are likely to be persecuted if returned home, provided that the policies
and procedures do not stimulate the filing of a large number of nonbona fide claims that threaten both the accuracy of decisions and public
support for the program as a whole.
If this is an accurate statement of what the American goal should
be, then the present system falls alarmingly short of achieving it. A
critical observer of current policies and institutions would be led to
157. A generous asylum policy also raises issues of equity regarding overseas refugees waiting
for resettlement. (I am indebted to Michael Teitelbaum for calling this point to my attention.)
If there is a finite number of refugees the United States is willing to admit each year, then a
huge increase in the number of aliens granted asylum may affect the willingness of the United
States to select refugees from camps overseas. Is it rational for American policy to reward refugees
who can make it to the United States on their own over refugees who cannot? There is no easy
answer here.
One response is that, given our accession to the Geneva Convention, we have little choice
but to recognize the claims of bona fide asylum applicants. But the Geneva Convention only
mandates a policy of non-refoulment (nonreturn), not the granting of a formal residence. A •
second response is that our refugee law, as actually implemented, applies a stricter standard
for asylum applicants than for overseas refugees. Finally, it may well be that any inequity that
exists cannot be overcome until an international approach to asylum is agreed to by the receiving
countries of the world. Under such a strategy, as conceived by Dale F. Swartz, President of
the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum, countries of first asylum would transfer
applicants to an international holding center where claims could be adjudicated. Aliens recognized as refugees would then be resettled in a country which may or may not be the country
in which the alien first claimed asylum. This proposal would go a long way toward ameliorating
the present appearance of inequity.
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conclude that we are pursuing two rather different goals: first, the deterrence of all asylum claims from aliens whose countries of origin are
friendly to the United States (particularly Haiti and El Salvador); and
second, effective control of decisions by the State Department, which
can inject political considerations into the process in the guise of aiding
inefficient and undertrained immigration officials. In beginning to
rethink how American practices and institutions ought to be restructured, there are several lessons that can be drawn from the German
and French experiences.
C.

Deterring the Filing of Claims

Should the United States adopt measures aimed primarily at reducing
the number of asylum claims? What is troubling about such a strategy
is that aliens with bona fide claims may be deterred or prevented from
applying and perhaps returned to likely persecution. 158 The challenge,
therefore, is to develop a set of policies that creates burdens or disincentives great enough to deter frivolous claims but not so great as to deter
bona fide claimants from applying. This appears to be the central aim
of the new West Germany policies. As stated openly by the German
Ministry of the Interior: "The sole objective of the [recent] measures
taken . . . has been, and still is, to remove the incentives for those
foreigners who are not politically persecuted to enter [West Germany]
illegally for economic reasons by abusing the rights of asylum." 159
Not surprisingly, advocates of asylum seekers attack the West German strategy as overbroad. They assert that the visa requirement and
housing program prevent true refugees from getting to Germany and
cause bona fide claimants in Germany to abandon good claims or seek
protection in another country. The response of the government is, in
effect, that aliens will get to Germany and tolerate current policies if
they have legitimate fears of persecution.
The obvious problem we face in fairly evaluating the German strategy
- or any other similar set of policies - is our extraordinary lack of
information regarding the motivations and actions of asylum seekers.
In such a vacuum, a policy of deterrence runs a serious risk of incorrect calibrations that produce dire consequences.
This is seen most dramatically in the Haitian interdiction program.
Presently, an American Coast Guard ship patrols the shores of Haiti,
stopping outbound vessels and returning aliens seeking to enter the
United States without documentation. Clearly, the purpose of the pro158. Of course, bona fide applicants deterred from filing in the United States may be able
to find safe haven elsewhere, or they may seek to enter the United States surreptitiously.
159. FEDERAL MINISTRY COMMENTS ON UNHCR REPORT, supra note 63 (unnumbered page 3).
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gram is to prevent Haitians from arriving in Florida where they can
file asylum claims and receive legal advice. Although American officials on board ask Haitians why they want to come to the United
States, many Haitians may be afraid to assert that they are victims
of political persecution, particularly if they are aware that the Coast
Guard cooperates with the Haitian government in regularly returning
vessels to Haiti. 160
Similarly, two district court cases describe border patrol conduct that
is aimed at convincing Salvadorans not to request asylum without any
investigation of the possible merits of such claims. 161 The government's
view is that Salvadorans are no different from other undocumented
workers whose only motives for entering the United States are economic.
It purports to substantiate this argument by noting that most
Salvadorans pass through Mexico or other third countries where they
could seek asylum before coming to the United States. The government further asserts the fact that ninety percent of the apprehended
-Salvadorans voluntarily depart from the United States demonstrates
that no real fear of return exists. 162
Both these positions are dangerously simplistic. The first fails to make
a crucial distinction between why an alien leaves her home country
and why she chooses a particular country in which to ask for asylum.
The current civil war in El Salvador, graphically and gruesomely
reported by the American media, makes untenable any claim that all
asylum seekers from that country have left solely for economic reasons.
Such reasons may well explain why they file claims here; but they do
not indicate ipso facto that the claims are frivolous. As to the second
argument of the government, a UNHCR report on treatment of
Salvadorans in the United States provides troubling data. Apparently
many Salvadorans choose return to El Salvador over long-term detention either because they are more willing to assume the risk of harm
in returning than to remain in confinement, or because they will later
160. See Helton, supra note I, at 256-57. Moreover, the exchange of notes specifically provides
that "[t]he Government of the United States agrees to the presence of a representative of the
Navy of the Republic of Haiti as liaison aboard any United States vessel engaged in the implementation of the cooperative program." Agreement on Interdiction of Migrants, supra note
148. It is thus hardly surprising that no Haitian brought aboard a United States vessel has
requested asylum.
I 6 I. See cases cited supra note I 51.
162. C. JONES, supra note 20, at 3. Furthermore, a Senate Staff Report has concluded that
there is no creditable evidence that Salvadorans returned to El Salvador have been subjected
to persecution. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REFUGEE
PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 4-5 (Comm. Print 1983). See generally 129 CONG. REc. S12736
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). This finding is contested by asylum applicant advocates. See AMERICAN CrvIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND ALIEN RIGHTS
PROJECT, SALVADORANS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE FOR EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE 63-64, app. Ill (1983) (Report No. I).
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seek illegal reentry to the United States. 163 In neither case can we safely
assume that abandonment of a claim for asylum means necessarily that
the claim was frivolous.
The interdiction and detention policies in the United States, at least
as they are directed against Haitians and Salvadorans, give no guarantee
of deterring only frivolous claims. In short, a respectable policy of
deterrence has not been, and without far better information cannot
be, achieved.
Could the United States do better by adopting the German deterrent
policies? It is quite doubtful. First, this country already has two of
the German measures in place: aliens need visas to enter the United
States, and work authorization is only granted for asylum applicants
with "non-frivolous" claims. These policies seek to deter asylum applications by preventing aliens from getting to the United States or
by making this country a less attractive country in which to reside.
Given a porous border and a healthy demand for undocumented
workers, however, neither measure effectively deters unlawful entry.
Thus aliens with frivolous claims still are likely to be able to enter
and reside in the United States.
The communal housing program presents different issues. To understand how it might work, we must distinguish among three groups of
aliens: those who request asylum at the border; those who request it
while lawfully residing in the United States; and those who claim asylum
only after being placed in deportation proceedings. For the first group,
a communal housing policy might be reasonable. Indeed, short-term
detention - already authorized by the INA 164 - could be an acceptable policy, provided that mechanisms are available for release of aliens
with non-frivolous claims 165 and that the adjudication process moves
with expedition. Short-term detention would let aliens at the border
know that an asylum claim is not automatically a ticket for entry and
residence in the United States. It should be stressed, however, that the
163. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Mission to Monitor INS Asylum
Processing of Salvadoran Illegal Entrants - September 13-18, 1981, reprinted in 128 CONG.
REc. S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982).
164. INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1980).
165. From the closing of Ellis Island in 1954 until 1981, detention of excludable aliens was
the exception, not the rule. Jean v. Nelson, 7ll F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), dismissed in part,
rev'd in part, No. 82-5772, slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 1984) (en bane). The promulgation of
the present detention policy in the summer of 1981 reversed the presumption. Now an undocumented alien stopped at the border is detained unless she can demonstrate special reasons
for release, such as a serious medical condition, pregnancy, or close relatives in the United States
who may file a visa petition on her behalf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b), 212.5(a) (1983).
Aliens who request asylum at the border should be released into the custody of relatives or
private agencies if their claims appear to be non-frivolous. The current regulations already call
for INS to make such a determination: aliens who file "non-frivolous" claims for asylum may
be granted employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1983).
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current American detention policy goes far beyond the German housing
program. Whatever deterrence the German policy brings about, longterm imprisonment - which too many asylum seekers in this country
have suffered - runs a real risk of being inhumane and causing aliens
to abandon legitimate claims. 166
For the second category - aliens who request asylum while lawfully
in the United States - a housing program would not be appropriate.
Aliens in this category are the most likely to have legitimate claims,
and requiring them to move into government housing facilities would
be a needless expense.
For the third group - aliens already in a deportation proceeding
- a communal housing policy would also be expensive and would have
uncertain results. Conceivably, some aliens with frivolous claims might
decide not to press them if it meant having to leave one's home for
a government facility. But unless such facilities are detention centers,
there is little reason why an alien would not leave and return to his
American home. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that all
aliens who wait to file asylum claims in deportation hearings are making
frivolous claims. If some groups of aliens currently believe that the
government is not fairly adjudicating their claims, it may be rational
to hold off filing a claim until it is absolutely necessary.
In sum, current American policies aimed at deterring frivolous claims
either appear to be ineffective or give no adequate assurance that bona
fide claims are not also deterred. Policies recently adopted by the German government appear to offer little promise; some are already in
place in this country and others are not likely to be effective. These
conclusions suggest that efforts to deter the filing of mala fide claims
must proceed along two fronts. The first is improved border control
and short-term detention of aliens at the border who present patently
frivolous claims for asylum. The second is expedition of the adjudication of claims (without sacrificing accuracy). Expedition will diminish
incentives to file a claim that merely seeks to gain an alien time and
also will make acceptable a policy of detention at the border. The remainder of this Article will explore proposals for the reform of the
asylum adjudication process.

D.

Procedural and Structural Reform

Development of a fair and expeditious process would have a substantial deterrent effect on frivolous claimants: would-be migrants in their
home countries would see earlier voyagers who were stopped at the
border returning home after only a short stay in the United States.
166.

See Helton, supra note l, at 259.
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An expedited process would also mean that filing an asylum claim would
no longer be a way to put off deportation for a considerable period
of time. Equally important, a reformed asylum adjudication process
would restore faith that the system is not being manipulated for political
purposes and could obviate the need for intrusive judicial intervention
which has severely slowed the process. If we are willing to seriously
reformulate the way asylum claims are adjudicated in the United States,
the West German and French systems provide some extremely interesting
possibilities.
1. The need for an independent federal agency to adjudicate asylum
claims- Foremost is the need for the United States to create an independent federal agency to adjudicate asylum claims. 167 As described
in Part I, an alien may apply for asylum to an INS official or an immigration judge. Adjudicating asylum claims may be a small portion
of these officials' duties. Moreover, few have specialized training in
international law or refugee matters; they therefore almost universally
rely upon "advice" received from the State Department. The involvement of the State Department creates opportunities for political considerations to affect decisions on the merits of the claim and adds
another layer to the process.
The adjudication systems in West Germany and France suggest an
alternative for the United States. Both countries have a centralized
federal agency whose only mission is to adjudicate asylum claims. The
existence of such an institution fosters the development of expertise
and knowledge, the evenhanded application of rules and policies, and
far less reliance upon the foreign ministries for information and advice. In both countries, decision makers can concentrate on particular
countries and become thoroughly familiar with conditions, events,
political parties, and social groups in those countries. This kind of
expertise significantly improves the ability of the decision makers to
judge the credibility of the applicant.
Adoption of this model in the United States could help ensure a
similar expertise in decision making. Furthermore, the centralization
of asylum adjudications would also end the present maldistribution
of asylum claims among INS districts. It would also facilitate the creation of a library and documentation center which could be available
to both decision makers and lawyers. 168 Obviously some logistical problems would occur. But both Germany and France have recently opened
167. At least two federal agencies are solely adjudicatory bodies: the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976), and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V 1981).
168. Presently, documentation centers are being established by attorneys representing asylum
claimants. See 60 Interpreter Releases 975 (1983) (documentation center to assist Salvadoran asylum
claimants created by American Civil Liberties Union Fund of the National Capitol Area and
the Center for National Security Studies).
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up a few suboffices in other cities. That model could be adopted here,
or adjudicators could conceivably "ride circuit."
The establishment of an independent agency to adjudicate asylum
claims would have the additional salutary effect of decreasing the
likelihood of court intervention in the processing of claims. Under the
current system, courts have ordered intrusive injunctive relief when
faced with evidence of massive violations of due process. The adjudication of Haitian asylum claims, for example, has been tied up by courts
for nearly a decade: Independent agency adjudication of asylum claims
would help alleviate this problem; courts would have increased confidence in the fairness and accuracy of decisions reached by an agency
operating with a corps of professional, well-trained adjudicators who
are removed from the enforcement side of the immigration system.
2. The independence of the federal agency and the removal of the
advisory role of the State Department- A serious problem with the
present American asylum system is the widely shared perception that
it is politically biased. The German and French experiences demonstrate
that no governmental agency is fully immune from political pressures.
But the general perception in both countries is that the federal asylum
agencies are largely free from political influence. No such perception
exists in the United States. The relative ease with which Eastern Europeans and Cubans have been granted asylum as opposed to the extremely low recognition rates for Haitians and Salvadorans casts a long
shadow on the proclaimed neutrality of the system. A major purpose
of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to remove the political and ideological
aspects of American refugee law, but many persons involved in the
process are not convinced that this has occurred. Establishment of an
agency outside the Department of Justice and not dependent upon the
State Department would help eliminate the appearance of, and potential for, political influence in the asylum process. 169 The agency could
be run by a Board of Directors appointed for lengthy, staggered terms
by the President with advice and consent from the Senate. 110 The Board
169. Of course, formal independence cannot ensure actual independence, particularly if agency
personnel aFe drafted from the ranks of the State and Justice Departments. Furthermore, the
literature on administrative law and policy abounds with stories of "capture" of supposedly
independent agencies. Yet some grounds for hope exist here. First, it would be advisable to adopt
the provision in the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation that prohibits current immigration judges from
sitting as judges in asylum cases until they have received special training in international relations
and international law. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124 (1983), 129 CONG. REc. S6975 (daily
ed. May 18, 1983). Second, it is not obvious who would "capture" the new agency. Certainly
asylum applicants do not have the requisite political power.
170. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1201-1209 (1982) (Merit Systems Protection Board; three members appointed by the President of which not more than two may be of the same political party; seven
year terms; removal only for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance); 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976)
(Corporation for Public Broadcasting; fifteen member Board of Directors; no more than eight
directors may be members of the same political party; six year, staggered terms).
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would be responsible for selecting an Executive Director who would
hire qualified adjudicators and other staff. The agency's independence
could be further demonstrated by following Germany's example of permitting the UNHCR to have a permanent observer at the agency.
Crucial to the independence of the agency would be the termination
of the State Department's "advisory" role. Presently, the asylum section of the State Department's Bureau on Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs is asked to issue an opinion on each asylum claim,
and such opinions generally must be "cleared" with the relevant country
desk in the Department. Officials in both the French and West German agencies openly talked about the problems of crediting information and advice from foreign service officers and ambassadors who
have diplomatic roles to perform. The centralized, single-mission nature
of both agencies has permitted each to develop sufficient expertise to
make reliance upon the respective foreign ·ministry unnecessary.
Obviously, it would be a mistake to deny the State Department any
role in the asylum process. It is perhaps the best source of information
on conditions in other countries, and both the French and German
agencies often seek information from their foreign ministries. But the
independent asylum agency should use information from other sources
as well, such as newspapers, Amnesty International, academics, and
expert witnesses. In no case should the State Department be asked to
render an opinion on whether or not the individual is entitled to refugee
status; rather, the State Department should be seen as precisely what
it is: one very good source of information, but not the decision maker. 111
This limited role for the State Department is bound to benefit the
government as much as the alien. It will help deflect charges of political
interference, and it will clearly separate the legal issue of "refugeeship"
from the political issues of foreign policy.
3. Limiting opportunities of review- The French system has only
one real level of judicial review of the administrative decision (although
appeals to Conseil d'Etat are technically possible). Germany has
streamlined its judicial process considerably. The United States, however,
has a system that guarantees multi-level review through several avenues.
These opportunities for judicial review must be limited if any progress
is to be made on speeding up the process. Assuming a new agency
is created with the requisite independence and expertise, judicial review
should be restricted.
At least two models of appellate review are worth exploring. The
first would make decisions of the new agency reviewable in a federal

171. Additionally, it may be advisable to give the State Depanment statutory authority to
intervene in a particular case on its own motion. This would guarantee the government the ability
to bring important facts to the attention of the decision maker.
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court of appeals as part of a petition for review under present law
from an exclusion or deportation order. 112 (This would mean that aliens
who are in a lawful status would not be able to appeal a denial of
an asylum claim. Only when the government sought to return the alien
would appellate review be possible.) Under this plan, review could be
limited further in two ways. First, in cases where deportability is not
contested and the federal agency has determined the claim to be "clearly
without merit," a single appellate judge could be authorized to dismiss
the alien's claim if she conclude~ that the alien raises no serious issue
of law in his appeal. 173 Second, the Supreme Court could be denied
jurisdiction in cases determined by the appellate court to be "clearly
without merit." 174
This proposed structure would reduce the levels of appeal, but it
would still hold the asylum process hostage to the burgeoning dockets
172. Under current law, deportation orders are reviewable in the Courts of Appeals; exclusion orders may be challenged only by way of a habeas corpus proceeding in a District Court.
INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982). The House version of the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation
would make exclusion orders reviewable in the same fashion as deportation orders. See H.R.
REP. No. 1510, § 123, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
71, 115-16 (1983). This would be a sensible change because it would eliminate one level of review.
173. This procedure would be somewhat analogous to the federal rules governing habeas
corpus proceedings which permit a judge to dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the
face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant
is not entitled to relief." Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts, Rule 4(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
A further streamlining of the system could deny any court review in a case which the federal
agency determines to be "clearly without merit." This proposal, however, does not appear to
comport with the UNHCR's recommendation that applicants denied asylum "be given a reasonable
time to appeal for a formal reconsideraton of the decision, either to the same or to a different
authority, whether administrative or judicial." OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS para. 192 (1979). This objection could be cured by creating an internal appeals panel
in the federal agency to review claims deemed to be frivolous by the initial decision maker. It
might be argued that a system that makes the administrative determination final and unreviewable
raises a serious constitutional issue. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). However, the availability of habeas corpus prior to the alien's
removal from the country should allay any constitutional doubts.
174. In response to these suggestions regarding limitations on judicial review, Arthur Helton,
Director of the Political Asylum Project of the Lawyers Committee for International Rights,
has written the following:
Certainly, to the extent that due process is enhanced in the administrative context,
recourse to judicial review will be necessary less frequently. However, it seems to me
unwarranted to assume that even with the structural reforms that you propose administrative due process will, in fact, be enhanced. Immigration authorities in the United
States have steadfastly refused to implement the Refugee Act of 1980. As a matter
of policy, then, it may make more sense to attempt the administrative reforms that
you propose, and yet maintain full judicial review as a failsafe mechanism.
Letter to the author (February 2, 1984). No doubt, as Helton asserts, there is always a risk
that in limiting avenues for rev_iew, some mistakes made at the administrative level will not be
caught. But the present system of "full judicial review" imposes severe costs on the asylum
process. The creation of an independent federal agency should remove much of the bias Helton
sees in the current system. If so, then streamlined judical review appears appropriate and advisable.
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of the federal appellate courts. 175 Accordingly, a novel alternative, patterned somewhat after the French system, might be advisable: appeals
from the federal agency could go to a special tribunal for asylum
appeals. 116 The membership of the tribunal could include designated
federal judges, distinguished members of the bar or nonlawyers
knowledgeable in international and refugee affairs, and a representative
of the UNHCR. No appeal beyond the tribunal would be allowed,
although habeas corpus would - by constitutional necessity - be
available to challenge the constitutionality of the proceedings. 111 The
tribunal could also be empowered to dismiss an appeal on the pleadings
if the claim was determined by the agency to be "clearly without merit."
4. The need to accommodate foreign policy concerns: presidential
granting of "safe haven"- Refugee and asylum issues are too wrapped up in fundamental issues of foreign policy and international relations to permit creation of an adjudication process that is entirely free
of political influence. The creation of an independent federal agency
that excludes the political branches from any formal voice would be
an improvement, but it is not enough. It would also be advisable to
create forums quite distinct from the adjudication process in which
political considerations could legitimately be exercised.
One example of this is the authority of the Laender governments
in Germany to withhold expulsion of persons even though their asylum
claims have been denied. This is viewed simply as a political decision,
and one that can be accomplished without putting pressure on the
Bundesamt to stretch the definition of ''refugee'' or to avoid deciding
certain claims.
A similar distinction between adjudication and politics should be
developed in the United States. Current practices evidence a confusion
of adjudicative and political functions that undermines procedural
credibility and effectiveness. This confusion is best evidenced in the
government's use of "extended voluntary departure." Extended voluntary departure (EVD) - an inelegant phrase for an administrative prac175. In 1979, 20,219 appeals were filed in federal Courts of Appeals - almost twice as many
as in 1969 and over five times as many as in 1960. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 10 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). The median
time between the filing and disposition of an appeal exceeds a year in both the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1982, at 13.
176. Appellate panels specially designated for particular purposes are no stranger to the
American judicial system. See, e.g., General Rules of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
of the United States, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976); Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. V 1981); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-181 I (Supp. V 1981). Those panels, however, are comprised solely of federal judges.
177. Habeas corpus relief should be available only if the applicant alleges deprivation of
a constitutional right. The Senate version of Simpson-Mazzoli appears to so limit habeas review.
S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 123 (1983); see S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1983).
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tice supported by questionable statutory authority - is a technique
used by the government to keep deportable aliens in the United States.
Since 1960, the government has adopted EVD programs for nationals
of fifteen different countries. 118 Some programs have lasted only a few
months; others far longer. Presently, Ugandans, Poles, Ethiopians, and
Afghanis benefit from blanket grants of EVD; they are not sent home
even if found deportable.
The EVD programs have often served as a low visibility means for
the accomplishment of American foreign policy objectives. Thus, Poles
have been granted EVD as part of the United States' response to Soviet
involvement in Poland, even though most of the Poles do not satisfy
the definition of "refugee" in the immigration act. The government,
however, has refused to grant EVD to Salvadorans. It has defended
its decision on the grounds that "the degree of civil strife varies greatly
in different parts of El Salvador," and that "a grant of EVD would
probably constitute a magnet inducing members of the beneficiary
nationality to enter the United States illegally." 179
The reasons cited by the government for denial of EVD to
Salvadorans have been assailed as erroneous and disingenuous. Critics
assert that the government's policy toward Salvadorans in the United
States is part of its economic and military support for the regime in
El Salvador. More importantly, the government's foreign policy objectives are said to account for the extremely low number of Salvadoran
asylum claims that have been granted. Thus, the overall perception
is that purportedly humanitarian programs - asylum and EVD - are
178. EVD programs have been instituted for aliens from several countries.
Dates of Program
Country
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Chile
Cambodia
Vietnam
Laos
Lebanon
Ethiopia

(1960-66)*
(I 968-present)• •

(April-May 1971)
(1975-77)*
(1975-77)*
(1975-77)*
(1976-present)
(1971-1981; still in effect for those
who arrived prior to June 1980)
(1971-present)••
(1977-present)•• ·
(1978-present)••
(I 979-1980)* •
(1979)**
(1980-present)
(1981-present)

Hungary
Rumania
Uganda
Nicaragua
Iran
Afghanistan
Poland
• Status regularized by statute.
•• Case-by-case determination in effect at present.
INS ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 8, at 67-68.
179. Letter from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to Congressman John J. Moakley
(July 30, 1983); see Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Congressman Lawrence
J. Smith (July 19, 1983).
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being driven by political considerations. The perception is strengthened
when one appreciates that EVD decisions and asylum adjudications
are both joint decisions of the Departments of Justice and State.
What is needed are different channels that separate political decisions from the asylum decisions. The creation of an independent asylum
agency would be an obvious start; but this must be supplemented by
statutory changes in the immigration law that clearly locate EVD decisions for classes of aliens outside the asylum process. This could be
accomplished by enacting legislation that expressly authorizes the President to grant "safe haven" to classes of aliens when he determines
such action to be in the national interest. 180 (The immigration laws
presently give the President authority to suspend the entry of classes
of aliens if he deems such entry to be detrimental to the interests of
the United States. 181 ) A grant of "safe haven" would be a political
decision conferring on the aliens no entitlement to remain in the United
States beyond the life of the proclamation and should in no way influence the asylum process. Aliens afforded such protection should be
able to apply for asylum and have their claims adjudicated. The federal
agency would not simply put all such claims on hold, as the INS
presently does for aliens granted EVD.
This separation of adjudication and political concerns should leave
the federal asylum agency more freedom to carry out its mandate irrespective of the political objectives of the Administration. It would
thus help eliminate the appearance that the asylum process is being
used simply to further American foreign policy objectives.
CONCLUSION

The proposals described here pursue a goal familiar to lawyers and
public administrators: better decisions through a more independent, expert, and centralized process. The idea (and ideal) that institutions can
be created to apply neutrally a shared conception of the public interest
has been around at least since the early years of this century. Unfortunately, almost every part of this fantasy is denied by what we know
about how the real world operates. Independent agencies may sometimes
be "captured" by the interests they are supposed to be regulating; agency
adjudicators may care more about meeting bureaucratic performance
standards than deciding cases correctly; decision makers inhabit a world
of values and political pressures; "the public interest" cannot be objectively identified or deduced from shared premises. The recent experience
180. This proposal has been more fully developed in Refugee Assistance Hearings, supra
note 43, at 102-04 (prepared statement of the author).
181. INA § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1982).
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of the reconstituting of the "independent" Civil Rights Commission
shows how far the real can deviate from the ideal.
What, then, is the value of "better process" in the asylum context?
Perhaps it reduces to nothing more than the claim that greater expertise
and independence are far better than what we have now. 182 Centralizing
the process, upgrading the expertise of the adjudicators, downplaying
the role of the State Department, and creating a new avenue for political
decisions should go far in removing the primary causes of concern about
the present system. 183 The French and German models provide some
ground for cautious optimism here.
Yet "better process" will not solve all the problems facing the current asylum system. Process is not neutral; it is instrumental. It should
be obvious that the best process in the world is worthless if it applies
substantive legal standards that are intolerable. Thus, procedural improvements cannot permit us to ignore questions regarding the scope and
meaning of our substantive asylum law. Nor should procedural reforms
blind us to unacceptable policies currently in place that attempt to prevent applicants from filing asylum claims. As argued above, some current policies of deterrence are probably impossible to implement with
any decent assurance of accuracy. Finally, "better process"· may
ultimately be unavailing if the future brings huge increases in asylum
requests. To a large degree, the number of asylees will depend upon world
events over which we have little control. There are thousands of Cubans
who would come to Florida if given the opportunity, and thousands of
Haitians in the Bahamas. Moreover, military coups could bring us
substantial numbers of applicants from Guatemala, Honduras, or other
Latin American countries. Clearly, everything would be up for grabs if
every undocumented alien apprehended this year - probably well over
one million - were to request asylum.
Although "better process" cannot guarantee perfect decisions, clarify
underlying legal standards, or stop world events that create asylum applicants, it can make a number of immediate, tangible improvements.
In the search for such improvements, the German and French experiences
offer some suggestions worth pursuing.

182. Cf. J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DJSABWTY Cl.AJMs
78 (1983) ("The realization that the ideal of instrumentally rational administration cannot be
achieved does not justify a resigned cynicism, . . . only a more balanced idealism.").
183. No doubt, there is some risk that the agency can be "packed" by an Administration
favorable or unfavorable to the claims of applicants from particular nations. A system of staggered,
lengthy terms for board members should reduce the risk. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (seven
year staggered terms for Federal Trade Commissioners).

